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PREFACE
The writer has made a sincere attempt to credit all
sources utilized in the development of this paper How-
ever, we recognize that one's writing somehow represents
his total exposure to knowledge. In this sense, all of
the material contained herein is in reality a distilla-
tion of the ideas of others, with the possible exception
of the specifics of the sample threat analysis. We would
give explicit credit to Rear Admiral W. T, Kinsella
USN (Ret) , Commander Ed Foote USN (Ret) , and Mr. M. W.
Fox of General Electric' s TEMPO Staff, who jointly posed
the original sample problem, and to them and the many
others of TEMPO who helped mold original efforts toward
the sample threat analysis used herein. We would also
express a deep sense of appreciation to Professor C. C.
Torrance for his direction, editing and cogent thoughts
on the problem while serving as faculty advisor; to
Professor H. B. Marks for his valuable assistance as
second reader; and to Mrs. Hazel Foster for her meticulous




This thesis is concerned with the application of
scientific research methods to subjective problems, such
as threat analysis. A submarine threat in limited war is
used as an illustrative example Measures of effectiveness
and sample courses of action are discussed. Some recent
applicable results in the field of psychology by such
authors as SCHELLING and GUTTMAN are briefly summarized.
It is indicated that man-machine simulation is the most





In complex problems involving subjective factors,
such as threat analysis, it is necessary to clarify vague
ideas, such as deterrent value, and to distinguish between
real causal relations and nominal mathematical relations
indicated by correlation or "goodness of fit." How such
relations are to be determined or evaluated is the start-
ing point for this paper. We are, however, not concerned
with specific methodologies. Rather, it is our intent to
illustrate how the complexity and uncertainty of important
subjective problems require the application of a scientific
team effort, and further to discuss how the full potential
of such effort can be achieved. The approach adopted in
this paper is heuristic, i.e. , serving to discover or to
stimulate investigation.
A sample threat analysis is used herein as a frame-
work for discussion. A submarine threat in limited war is
defined, measures of effectiveness developed, and sample
courses of action examined. The writer has attempted to
rely as far as possible on fact, rather than opinion, in
developing the sample problem. However, this is primarily
a heuristic effort, and is obviously not quantitative
scientific research. For this reason, formal conclusions
relative to the sample problem will not be included in this
paper.
We have used the specific problem to illustrate induc-
tively both the difficulties and potential of the
iv

"scientific method" in each component part of a subjec-
tive problem We believe that we have shown that sub-
jective factors can be dealt with in a systematic, logi-
cal and semi-quantitative manner leading to conclusions
that are more significant and reliable than those obtain-
able by independent experience and judgment. Specific
potential for future research and application is indicated
in the views of CHURCHMAN on use of trend analysis for
determining value functions (Chapter III), in the theo-
retical and experimental development of subjective meas-
urements by GUTTMAN (Appendix II), and in SCHELLING'
s
relatively novel approach to game theory (Appendix III).
We recognize that any problem with significant sub-
jective factors will require application of judgment and
experience at some level in the decision process. But
experience and judgment have certain basic components
which can be identified by suitable investigating proce-
dures such as simulation. We have concluded that within
the present state of the art, man-machine simulation is
the most effective research tool for testing the results
of subjective investigations. We would recommend that
basic research in this area be directly correlated with
various outstanding problems involving subjective judg-
ment. We believe a scientific team effort is required
for such research to insure achievement of maximum quan-
tification of those factors for which meaningful numerical
values can be assigned. It is further concluded that

basic simulation research in psychological areas offers
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Our enduring aim is to build a nation and help
build a world in which every human being shall
be free to develop his capacities to the fullest.
National Goals: Report of the President's
Bipartisan Commission 1960.
No force on earth can hold back the course of the
world communist revolution which will end in a
worldwide Soviet Republic
LENIN 1918
History is moving inexorably toward the ultimate
victory of socialism and communism throughout the
world.
KRUSCHEV 1959
These statements are typical of many that assert we
live in a bi-polar world. They represent the viewpoint
that support of one of these aims is qualification as an
antagonist of those who support the other, and that there
can be no realistic middle ground. The existence of such
a sharp dichotomy is, of course, debatable. However, the
development of this theme has led to a greater recognition
and understanding of a threat throughout the spectrum of
war. Of prime significance has been the realization that
dominant success in just one area, say economic or even
psychological warfare, may be sufficient for attainment of
all ultimate objectives But because this viewpoint has
stressed a multiple threat to survivability, it has fos-
tered a responsive strategy. As a result, potential U. S
reaction to an identified threat is reasonably predictable.
As an extreme example, the fundamental policy of nuclear




The bipolar concept does not provide similar insight
for strategies in support of U. S. objectives. This is
attributable to the fact that the positive objectives of
the U S and the free world are not merely ill-defined
but are frequently divergent and of multipolar characteris-
tics. While U. S, defensive leadership has been generally
accepted, there is little agreement upon appropriate offen-
sive action of the free world. The consequence has been
almost complete surrender of the initiative to the Soviets.
It is obvious that at best this means a "Protracted Con-
flict" until this dilemma of the positive has been resolved.
There is no indication that this primal problem will soon
be solved. Therefore it is necessary that those concerned
with military problems learn how to live with this "fact of
life," for it increases the importance of relating military
requirements and actions to the total conflict.
There is one factor in this problem that may partially
offset the inherent advantage of the initiative. This fac-
tor originates in the form of communist dogma that is popu-
larly known as the "Doctrine of Inevitability " This doc-
trine of guaranteed eventual success is a basic tenet that
has been consistently supported by the changing stream of
communist leaders. Yet this doctrine may prove a fatal
weakness if properly exploited It does more than inhibit
a sense of urgency; it encourages what we would call "rational
behavior." Why risk destroying the world if inevitably

communism must rule it? It lends credence to a policy of
at least temporary coexistence. It facilitates acceptance
of tactical retreats. This doctrine may thus give us time
to attack the fundamental problem of regaining the initia-
tive. But this problem is not necessarily solvable within
the constraints of democratic processes. Hence we must
also use the time to determine the most effective means for
allocating and distributing our resources to counter both
the most significant and the most likely threats.
Unfortunately, our reguirements are not deterministic,
but are dependent upon complex and freguently subjective
factors. Actions, reactions, estimates, capabilities, in-
tentions, interpretations are all words that are difficult
to define precisely, but are indicative of the gualitative
factors affecting our reguirements. Although it is doubtful
that even the problem itself can be acceptably defined yet
it is important to stress that guantitative "answers" are
now being provided The National Budget, the deployment of
military forces, the allocation of foreign aid, and many
other acts of the Executive and Legislative Departments
represent problem "answers. " Whether or not they are real-
istic is freguently indeterminate. Answers are reguired in
real time and there are no experts or simple technigues for
determining total reguirements in complex predictive prob-
lems. But there is growing awareness and utilization of
something "better" than just intuition experience and judg-
ment This is the application of the technigues of the

research scientist. This paper is dedicated to the increased
adoption of the micro- and macroscopic attitudes and methods
of the research scientists in real world problems. It is
the intent of this writer to illustrate that a very real
capability does exist for attacking qualitative problems,
and to present some guidelines for more effectively utiliz-
ing this capability. However, we recognize that the scien-
tific invasion of this field is still not universally accepted
and we consider it desirable to discuss some of the more
prevalent objections:
A. Dangers of sub-optimization .
The magnitude of the problems being considered the
limitations in present techniques, and the restrictions of
real time have limited the application of scientific analy-
sis largely to certain component problems. But the solving
of component problems without proper placement of the "solu-
tions" against the background of the whole problem involves
sub-optimization. However, the dangers of sub-optimization
are worse than failing to give a genuinely optimal solution.
A solution in one area may complicate, confound, or even
change the problem in another area. Even the existence of
a partial solution may conceivably create new problems.
For example, a highly reliable "strike second" nuclear
weapon system may effectively nullify the threat of destruc-
tion by an ICBM force. But its potential against the threat
of destruction by any means whatsoever is less clear It
apparently has little application against the threat of

gradual erosion through peripheral communist expansion.
Further, the existence of the threat of nuclear exchange,
and an exaggerated threat of world destruction, may weaken
resistance to all other forms of communist aggression.
Thus sub-optimization may well lead to creation of new prob-
lems, even if it provides answers to old ones But in doing
so, it will normally further limit the scope of the problem
that must be solved by judgment. If scientific analysis
can provide relatively precise quantitative information in
one area, it may tend to confirm or deny hypotheses in
related areas that might not otherwise be evaluable.
Actually, scientists are trained to live in a world of
sub-optimization if only because the systems being investi-
gated, or the specialized training of men, will rarely permit
an attack on a whole problem. We are inclined to picture the
scientist as always working in a precise accurate laboratory
atmosphere. But can he work in an environment where the
variables are measured only in orders of magnitude? A brief
exposure to accomplishments in such fields as underwater
acoustics or submarine geology will provide convincing argu-
ment that he can. The variables in a typical acoustics
equation can be measured in accuracy varying from millivolts
to miles. Yet the scientists have been able to use these
equations to design effective underwater sound equipment.
Prior to the IGY, the submarine geologist drew his relief
maps from scattered data where the navigational accuracy
alone differed by orders of magnitude. His charts have

since been reasonably substantiated The scientist has
been able to predict and verify subterranean characteristics
with limited data despite the lack of an acceptable theory
of ocean formation.
These examples are not intended to minimize the dan-
gers of sub-optimization, but rather to illustrate the
scientific capability of exploiting partial hypotheses. If
relatively precise answers to one area of a problem are
obtained, the methodology can frequently be transferred to
other areas. This will at least illuminate areas requiring
further study, and is a prerequisite to the development of
a systems approach to the entire problem
B. Denial of a scientific basis because of the lack
of data or other experimental verification
In transferring the scientific methods from the labora-
tory, there has been much emphasis on the lack of poor qual-
ity of the data, without adequate recognition of different
accuracy standards and requirements. Time plays two impor-
tant roles in this transfer There is first the obvious
fact that decisions must be made in real time and hence we
must act on the basis of knowledge available or reasonably
obtainable. The second is a recognition that the state of
knowledge in different fields may reflect different time
scales. A methodology in disuse in one. field may have cur-
rent application in another. For example, the numerical
analysis methods of Newton may have been superseded for
hand calculations, and yet provide a preferential logic for

computer application. Data that are inappropriate for analy-
sis of mathematical expectation may prove adequate in deter-
mining psychological expectations. (The implication and
potential of non-mathematical expectation in a probabilistic
sense is explored in Appendix III. ) The importance of data
is indicated by one school of thought that states that
"Truth" is dependent upon experimental verification. It is
believed that this requirement stems from the once predomi-
nant belief in a set of "fixed" laws of nature Thanks to
such developments as the "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle,"
we now know that there are limits in ascertaining the "Truth"
of even physical phenomena We would claim that the question
of truth is frequently a semantical one, but that it is in
man's quest for the truth that useful knowledge is obtained.
Much of what we call factual truths are models of an un-
defined reality and the usefulness of the models are gener-
ally independent of their labeling. Consider the classifi-
cation of the elements. Our current methods may be essen-
tial to the technology of our era, but would doubtfully have
provided a useful concept to the ancients who recognized
fire, air, earth and water. For purposes of analysis we
would stress a utilitarian view of "Truth. " With reference
to the objections to a non-scientific basis, we would con-
sider the data problem a limiting, not nullifying factor.
Experimentation may be inaccurate, unrealistic or even
impossible. The analysis may be crude with reference to the
discipline in which the techniques of the analysis have

been developed. But the validity of a scientific basis
must rest upon the relative contribution in the applied
field It is hoped that this paper will demonstrate that
scientific analysis will at least permit more effective
judgment than could otherwise be anticipated and further
provide a measure of confidence in such judgment.
C. Preponderance of qualitative factors may make any
attempt at quantification meaningless .
This is stated with reference to those problems where
qualitative factors may be of dominant significance, such as
those dependent upon measurement of subjective probabilities
or value functions. A review of the literature in utility
(value) theory or subjective probability is convincing proof
that the tools of measurement are crude and in an early
stage of development. Most papers in these fields have dealt
with restricted and highly specialized problems. Empirical
substantiation has rarely been possible, so that frequently
the theorizing has been dismissed as mere opinion. This
criticism exists not with reference to the contribution to
the theory but to the validity of practical application.
To answer this criticism, there is a difference we would con-
vey between the value of an opinion and an opinion value.
The first represents an assignment of value to the human
mind as a measurement instrument. Although this is a sub-
jective value, it is frequently quantified in the form of
consultant fees, payment to expert witnesses etc. What we
have called an opinion value represents the specific
8

measurement obtained by mental estimate. It is the quantifi-
cation of such estimates, the calibration of this instrument,
that is normally questioned in its application to subjective
factors. Certainly not all mental estimates are readily
quantifiable, but what is important is that many are. Con-
sider first one man's opinion, which may depend upon an infi-
nite number of hereditary and environmental factors. But if
two or three such factors predominate and are identifiable,
quantification of these may provide sufficient information
for statistical predictions. The extension of this notion
to predict group opinion, intensity of opinion, correlation
with a willingness to act, etc., is obvious - providing the
requisite quantification is indeed possible., This in turn
depends upon our ability to use the mind as a measuring
instrument. We would recall that the mind is the original
measuring instrument and the prototype of all others. The
logic and methodology to be used in the application of mental
measurements (as distinct from normative judgments) is often
the same as in the application of physical measurements.
The only real difference is in accuracy and reliability
obtainable. In mental measurement of physical quantities
(psycho-physical measurements) we learn concepts such as
weight, distance or time through identification of some
consistent or unique criteria of reference Similarly in
psychological measurements, we can learn to identify and
observe those factors that will provide a criteria for con-
cepts of a more subjective nature. We commonly use the mind

to assess "facts" which are substantiated opinions. Progress
is being made in using this "instrument" to assess opinions
which may represent unsubstantiated facts. (Some of the
recent results obtained in the field of psychological measure-
ment are discussed in Appendix II. It is believed that they
illustrate a growing competence in useful measurement of qual-
itative factors.
)
Relative to the objections we would stress that mental
measurements play a key role when complex predictive prob-
lems are "solved" by intuitition, judgment, or any other
method. The application of scientific analysis is not sug-
gested as an alternate method, but as another input to aid
the judgment process, and perhaps more important, the evalua-
tion of that process.
D. Fear of scientific usurpment of the decision func-
tion .
This is considered one of the more irrational objec-
tions, but it does exist, as evidenced in the following
quote
:
When such questions are asked, we frequently
fall all over ourselves to try to reassure the
manager that the last thing in the world we want to
do is to give him the impression that we are criti-
cizing him of inefficient management, or to cause
him to feel that we are trying to step in and take
over from him the job of managing his company....
A more accurate and much simpler reply to the
manager who asks if the Operations Research people
are not representing themselves as being able to
do a better job than the manager in some of the
functions he is being paid for is just a plain,
unembellished, "YES."
Dr. Dean E. Woolridge, President Ramo-Wool ridge
Corp. Journal of Industrial Engineering Vol VII
No. 5 Sept-Oct 1956
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This brief quote doesn't do justice to the exposition
and we would recommend the entire article as an outstanding
introduction to the role of the scientists in the decision
process. Although this article was slanted toward the in-
dustrial manager, the military commander has similar prob-
lems. Both are responsible for so many decisions that it is
impossible for the one individual to determine or even super-
vise anything but a fraction of these required. The rcle of
advisors to such executives must frequently approach a
deterministic force. Our concern should not be with whom
the decision actually originates, but the quality of product
decisions. If scientific analysis can provide either deci-
sions or a clear criteria in some areas, it will free
executive talent to attack problems that are dependent upon
strict judgment and experience. In the more significant
problems, ideally there would be a combined application of
scientific analysis and experience. Which factor happens
to dominate a particular problem is of little consequence.
Our initial concern should be the development of effective
communication between the areas to facilitate continued
coordination and correlation. In military applications,
our concern at present is not with usurping the functions
of the commander, but showing how he can effectively
utilize a new staff concept. Our future goal should be to
train more commanders in the utilization of scientific
analysis to remove the spotlight on the background of
incumbents and shed more light on the problem and decision
11

areas. We suspect that the industrial manager's problem
can be similarly stated.
E. Summary .
The validity of the objections and this writer's
response are of secondary importance. The validity of the
scientific approach to decision making must rest upon an
indicated or demonstrated positive contribution. The poten-
tial of such an approach can almost be substantiated by
definition: For our purposes, we will consider the scien-
tific approach to mean the employment of a multi-dicipline
group to attack real world problems using the logic, concepts
and methods of the laboratory. Individually, members of the
group can draw on the collection of solved problems and
techniques of their own discipline to apply to analagous
situations. Collectively, the group is united not only in
a common intellectual bond of the professional but in a
mutual facility (albeit in varying degree! ) with the uncom-
promising and universal language of the mathematician. The
primary unknown is whether or not the full potential of such
group effort can be achieved We are not concerned with the
effectiveness of such groups in post hoc operational analy-
sis or evaluation of weapon system capability. This has
been demonstrated, substantiated and reported to a point of
almost universal acceptance. We are instead concerned with
application to problems whose answers normally permit no pre-
dictable substantiation (e.g. , should Weapon System A or De-




The methodology of this paper is dependent upon the
employment of a sample problem as a framework for discus-
sion. Although perhaps obvious it should be stressed that
this paper in no way represents a solution to the sample
problem presented herein. Partial answers will be stated
to facilitate discussion of subjective factors and method-
ology, but it is not claimed that the answers are necessar-
ily valid and they are of course NOT the product of scien-
tific operations research. It is intended that this illus-
trative problem will indicate the potential of such re-
search.
The reason for selecting the particular problem is
considered pertinent to the reader's understanding of this
paper. A threat analysis was chosen because qualitative
factors dominate the problem, and because this type of
problem illustrates well the interdependence of actions
throughout the spectrum of war. The specific threat was
selected because the writer could find no indication that
this particular problem had been the subject of formal
research. If this exposition arouses sufficient interest
to evoke consideration by a research organization of what
is believed a significant threat to U. S. limited war
capability one of the primary purposes of this paper will




STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Definition Problem .
Many of the outstanding successes of Operational
Analysis have been accomplished in spite of poor problem
definitions. A complaint of poor gunsights in World War II
led British scientists to an accurate assessment of changes
in German tank armor. Claims of faulty IFF equipment led
an Air Force researcher to a discovery of faulty cockpit
procedures. (This problem was "solved" with a large sign at
the end of the runway: "TURN ON YOUR IFF.") Frequently
the stated problem definition was not critical because the
analyst could observe operations and verify hypotheses by
trial and error. It is clear that the research scientist
will not often have these advantages in predictive problems.
The really interesting problems are of a broad continuous
nature, and the definition is of utmost importance because
it inevitably represents some constraints. We would claim
that a "good" definition must provide both an expansion and
contraction of the specific problem. First, the problem
must be related to its larger background if the purpose of
the research is to be understood. Second, the problem must
be related to decision requirements so that constraints are
meaningful. We have alluded to the dangers of sub-optimiza-
tion earlier, but here we would stress an opposite facet.
There appears to be a natural inclination to emphasize
answers to the whole problem, or more frequently an
14

idealization thereof. Research so oriented rarely contri-
butes to the specific decision process for which the study
was undertaken. For example, consider the problem of pro-
tecting convoys in limited war. An idealization of the
whole problem may indicate the best defense is to bomb the
submarine pens. Aside from the question of whether or not
the submarines will be there, such an extension of the war
may not be in consonance with National Policy. A more
restricted research might provide firm justification for
500 more escorts, but considering budgetary constraints,
this answer is also not necessarily usable. Defining re-
search limits is difficult. We must allow for an honest
analysis of whether or not the real problem has been defined
But there must also be recognition of decision limits in the
form of time, money, manpower, technology and policy con-
straints. Because of the importance of problem definition,
the following check off list is suggested as indicating the
minimum requirements:
1. Problem origin (Appropriate Data appended).
2. General Statement of Problem.







5. Related research, intelligence and operational data
6. Reporting and liaison procedures.
B. The Sample Problem .
1. Problem origin .
A specific problem will be used as an aid to
15

discussion throughout the remainder of this paper. We again
stress that our purpose is to illustrate concepts about use
of scientific research in subjective analysis, not to demon-
strate methodologies Our attempts at analysis are crude
and constrained by both time and inherent limitations, but
we believe they will illustrate the potential attainable.
We start with an assumption that the U. S„ Navy is investigat-
ing its ability to accomplish limited war missions for the
following purposes:
a. Determine capability to respond to militant
communist aggression with available forces and within approx-
imately fixed budgetary constraints of 1961-1962 levels.
b. Determine weapon system requirements for the
1965-1970 time period . assuming a naval budgetary range of
12 to 14 billion dollars.
2. General Statement of the Problem .
It is assumed that the following component problem
is assigned for analysis:
"IS THERE A SUBMARINE THREAT IN LIMITED WAR AND
IF THE THREAT EXISTS, WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN
TO MINIMIZE THE THREAT?"
3. Problem Limitations .
Our primary emphasis will be on the current threat
and feasible actions within current budgetary manpower and
technological constraints. However we will attempt to





We will first digress to discuss the applicability
of scientific research to this type of problem. This will
be followed by a heuristic threat analysis. Measures of
effectiveness will then be discussed in general terms. The
research will be related to decision reguirements through
examination of selected courses of actions. Conclusions
will be restricted to procedural items rather than to results




TREATMENT OF SUBJECTIVE FACTORS FOR THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM
A. General Considerations
.
The employment of multi-discipline groups is an expen-
sive, time- and talent-consuming process. Such effort can-
not be justified unless a usable degree of measurability can
be achieved. Obviously, the key word here is usable In
complex predictive problems, we cannot expect a substitution
of precise facts for opinions. But, to be usable the re-
search must offer a quantitative means for evaluating deci-
sions which would otherwise be determined by intuition, judg-
ment or experience.
Scientists are claiming that they may provide a "better"
basis for decisions than professional executives in the field.
This claim is based on two general contributions presumably
unique to scientists. The first is in providing personnel
trained in the techniques of obtaining and analyzing scien-
tific observations. This capability of the "outsider" to
view the operation as a single entity has been substantiated
in both military and industrial operational analysis. How-
ever, this facet alone would not justify the scientific
invasion of the realm of decisions. It would appear much
more efficient and effective to train the operational man
in the techniques of scientific analysis. This would permit
full use of his operational experience and preclude neces-
sity for diverting critical scientific talent from their
original professions. The second potential contribution is
18

of much greater significance and is a result of the ever
increasing technology of this era. This is the ability to
relate knowledge obtained in diverse technical fields to
analagous problems. But if there is to be a capability for
applying these learned techniques to real world problems, a
multi-discipline group is required because the collection
of solved problems grows at a rapid exponential rate. As an
indication, consider the number of scientific journals,
which appears to double about every fifteen years. This num-
ber has grown from 300 in 1800 to over 100 000 today (1).
Unfortunately, the size and complexity of this "knowledge
store-house" indicates inherent pitfalls. The growth is
attributable largely to increased specialization with a con-
sequence that translation to other fields has become increas-
ingly difficult. For this reason, the quantification and
manipulation of the real world problem is normally accom-
plished after the problem has been translated to the require-
ments of the specialized domain. The validity of the analy-
sis therein is normally easily verifiable, but such "proofs"
are difficult to transport. Hence, the primary concern in
using analogical solutions is with the bridge to and from
the real world problem. It is within the structure of this
bridge that the usability of the measure must be justified.
This structure rests upon a subjective foundation of prob-
lem definition, constraints, and probability factors. Al-
though this structure is normally uniquely determined for
the problem at hand we will next consider some general
aspects affecting its construction.
19

B. Subjective inputs of a decision problem .
The type of problem being considered is critically
dependent upon subjective factors related to probability,
credibility, and capability How are these factors ob-
tained? There is one prevalent viewpoint that subjective
inputs must be "provided." It then becomes the responsibility
of the researcher to display the problem so that the intro-
duction of such inputs is meaningful to some "decision-
maker." Strict adherence to this procedure may result in
stressing means for obtaining HIS particular objectives to
the detriment of assessing the fundamental objectives rela-
tive to the assigned problem. It should be noted that we are
concerned with examining functional relationships and areas
of responsibility and not with performance of incumbents.
We must distinguish between the use of scientific personnel
as planners and the application of scientific research
methods to the planning function. This is not a minor ques-
tion of status, but a major query whose answer must affect
the value of the solutions offered. If the solutions are
claimed as the product of science rather than philosophy,
they must be based on some justifiable measure. It is one
of the purposes of this paper to illustrate that such subjec-
tive factors can frequently be a measurable input , not just
a "given" parameter. (Some of the recent results in measur-




C. Defining and implementing the "Scientific Method "
For purposes of discussion, we will hypothesize that
the following elements characterize the use of the scien-
tific method
:
1. Determine purpose or objective.
2. Establish a measure of effectiveness.
3. Obtain and analyze data.
4. Determine "solutions."
5. Evaluate "solutions."
What complications arise when these steps are applied
to a planning problem, rather than a laboratory or even an
operational one? First, the semantical difficulties are
frequently a predominant initial barrier This was men-
tioned earlier with reference to the problem of definition.
The first part of the sample problem illustrates the diffi-
culty:
"Is there a submarine threat in limited war?"
The answer is simply, Yes! - if by threat , any possibility
of submarine action is meant. The connotations conceivable
for limited war are even less bounded. Hence the problem
must be further delineated in terms that permit accurate
recognition and acceptance of the boundaries and constraints
appropriate to decisional requirements. In the remainder
of this paper, we will attempt a heuristic method for imple-
menting this viewpoint.
D. " Toward a Value Function " [3]
Unless the given problem is understood in relation to
its larger background there is grave danger of a "statis-
tical error of the third kind" : solving the wrong problem!
21

Consider our sample problem: Is this part of an effort to
provide a deterrence capability across the spectrum of war;
to determine defense requirements for a carrier strike
force; or to insure a capability of delivering some rate of
resources overseas? The dimensions of the measure of effec-
tiveness are naturally dependent upon the answers to this
question. These answers are in turn dependent upon proper
assessment of possible or permissible outcomes (of the real
problem) and their associated values Intuitively, we sense
that in a planning problem, there is some value attached to
the future occurrence or non-occurrence of an event; but
value to whom and by whom determined? In formal decision
and game theory, this is the province of the decision maker
or "player. " But is it reasonable to restrict or bias the
solution by demanding an intuitive based numerical value
that can dominate the research effort? SCHELLING (2) has
theorized that such abstraction may cause the loss of vital
factors when decisions are viewed as tacit or explicit
bargaining. (The significance of numerical values in both
conventional game theory and SCHELLING' s view of non-zero
sum games are explored briefly in APPENDIX III.) The dif-
ficulties involved in obtaining a set of functions, or
more frequently in practice, a set of constants, that accu-
rately reflect values in a dynamic situation are realized
Further, in complex predictive problems, the incumbent
decision maker and antagonists are subject to change prior
to implementing any solution. However, the fact that it is
22

difficult to obtain even a rank-order value scale should make
one hesitant to accept any arbitrariness, regardless of
source. Any solution implemented will either implicitly or
explicitly assign a value function. If scientific research
is to be optimally applied values must be a measurable in-
put to the problem. Without this capability, accurate ascer-
tainment of purpose or objective is impossible. Practical
results in dynamic utility or value theory are almost non-
existent, but strides are being made. CHURCHMAN (3) has
suggested a difficult, but seemingly appropriate, approach
in requiring that trend analysis be employed to develop
value functions. If we put the "solution" to our sample
problem in a simplified mathematical format we may gain
some insight as to how trend analysis could be applied:
1. The U. S will spend X. dollars to suppor 4 Y.
programs during the period T to T 4- t, .
2. The U. S will deploy U units to V. locations
i J
for periods T f t .r ok
This format facilitates recognition as a problem in alloca-
tion and distribution, one that is almost continually being
"solved." This is a dynamic problem with time lags such
that past and future decisions are liable to change the
structure of the problem. Hence, even if this complex
problem could be formulated, trend analysis of past deci-
sions would not yield an analytic method for future decisions
However, trend analysis would provide an estimation of the
value scale that had been applied to date. Such an analysis
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would depend in part upon effectively relating the alloca-
tion of total defense funds to weapon systems. The ground
work for this has been provided by CLEGG (4) , who has formu-
lated such a cost methodology for Navy weapon systems. If
this type of cost methodology were adopted, it would facil-
itate analysis of how funds are expended with respect to any
particular portion of the war spectrum. We believe that this
methodology would provide good correlation factors for deter-
mining our positive and negative utility for action at var-
ious levels of warfare. Analysis of distribution factors
pertinent to deployments would be a more complex problem.
But a general trend analysis of past movements could provide
an indication of the underlying decision criteria.
It is obvious that, within the present state of the art,
meaningful quantification of the values of potential out-
comes relative to the sample problem are beyond the scope of
this paper.
E. Concerning the probability measure .
In planning problems, one frequently encounters factors
which cannot be estimated by the usual techniques of proba-
bility and statistical analysis. Some of these factors are
not observable and adequate correlation factors have not
been determined. Frequently it is impossible to conduct
experiments without changing the problem. Occasional
isolated but critical factors do not appear to be repetitive.
In such problems, the uncertainty may be associated with
the actions of "opponents," the joint interactions of
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participants, or directly to possible "outcome states of
nature, " Probabilistic interest extends to both the direct
and sequential outcomes associated with any particular deci-
sion. (The secondary effects may clearly be an integral
part of a single decision process. ) Mathematically this
type of process is relatively easy to display in a Markovian
framework. But in practical applications
, it is frequently
impossible to list even the outcome "states of nature." We
are normally concerned with subjective probabilities which
are extremely difficult to measure with confidence. Just
the method of introducing the probability measure can par-
tially predetermine the solution. (Some further caution
pertinent to application of probability measures are dis-
cussed in Appendix III. ) It may well be that the optimal
method of handling probability measures is dependent upon the
specific problem. There are no easy generalities. But it
is suggested that the application of CHURCHMAN' s ideas on
trend analysis to the development of subjective probability
estimates from extensive simulation models could be fruitful.
The cost of such sophisticated analysis in time, manpower
and resources would be significant if viewed in isolation.
But viewed in terms of the cost of one of the potential wea-
pon system requirements, this would represent a small but
perhaps critical percentage.
F. Selection of a starting point for the research .
A brief perusal of the contents of the Journal of the
Operations Research Society of America may indicate a
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relatively easy classification of problems into such areas
as linear programming, game theory, calculus of variations
etc. This is attributed to a desire to disseminate profes-
sional techniques, security and proprietary considerations,
and requirements of condensation. In the practical prob-
lems, of which these articles normally represent just an
aspect, such initial classification is rarely possible
(unless the problem obviously required the services of a
mathematician or linear programmer, rather than a scientific
team effort). In most military problems, there are questions
relative to problem definition and constraint which are
dependent upon the threat. Accordingly, a threat analysis
is frequently a logical starting point for the research
effort. This provides a basis for initial evaluation of
possible actions and a necessary input for probability
analysis. This will be our next step in examining the sample
problem. It is not claimed that heuristic arguments that
follow truly represent a threat analysis. Rather, they are
indicative of the requirements and furnish further problem
background. The specific goal of the analysis should be to
relate the threat to the objective of the assigned problem.
For example we would expect the following of a formal
analysis of the sample problem:
1. Determine threat of submarine warfare to accomplish-
ment of U. S limited war objectives.
2. Provide a basis for comparing courses of action to
counter the threat with current forces and resources.
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3. Provide a basis for extrapolation to estimate effect
threat will have on requirements for U. S Navy forces in
1965-1970 time period.
4. Provide indication of additional threats. (e g.
,
if submarine is determined not to be a significant threat,
it is likely that some weapon system is planned in "oppose-







An ideal threat analysis would represent an evalua-
tion of the totality of factors affecting the opponent's
decision to implement the threat. We would claim that
attempting to approach this ideal will frequently result in
a confused maze of psychological and technological factors.
Some constraints for the problem are obviously necessary to
reduce it to manageable size These constraints are ex-
pressed in the selection of a frame of reference; time
periods must be designated to permit evaluation of techno-
logical factors affecting capabilities; and value scales
must be assigned to estimate psychological factors pertinent
to intentions. It is suggested that the orientation of the
reference frame must depend upon the purpose of the study:
providing a basis for decisions. Subjective judgment is
inherent in this process, and any conclusions of the analy-
sis are at best valid with respect to the assumed reference
frame. But let us realize that the threat itself represents
the culmination of a decision analysis by the "opponent."
From an innumerable set of variables, certain values have
been extracted and collated in the specific threat. The
threat is then the opponent's value representation of the
inter-related decision processes of the threatened and the
threatener. In other words, the very existence of a threat
indicates an "opponent's" assumption regarding at least the
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range of response decisions. Complete knowledge of these
assumptions is hardly conceivable, but it is also not
necessary, for the threat need be assessed only with respect
to the decisions the threatened is willing to make. The
essence of this concept is that the threat is viewed as a
primary factor in generating the decision criteria for the
threatened. The threat exists on the basis that it will be
credible with respect to some range of decisions. An ideal
decision criteria would examine the opponent's introspection
to isolate those conditions and decisions (if they exist)
that would make the threat incredible. Of course the
existence of an ideal anything is doubtful, but we would
claim this as a goal. The extent of the analysis must re-
flect the cost we are willing to invest in a decision and
the risk we are willing to assume in making a wrong or
delayed decision. This latter aspect assumes increasing
importance as we consider lead time requirements. But in
demanding explicit decisions affecting an uncertain future
are we restricted to a subjective comparison between a
"fair" one now or a "better" one later? Most likely but
the importance of these decisions demands what THORNTON
PAGE has called the application of all forms of human
knowledge to the solution of the whole problem. We would
claim that this requires a multi-discipline group effort
relying on both diversification and replication to par-
tially offset the uncertainties. Of even more importance
is effective leadership to focus cohesive group action
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within a minimum but realistic time period .
It is obviously impossible for one individual to demon-
strate such an approach even in our specific and limited
sample problem. Hence we will not herein attempt the threat
analysis pertinent to determining future navy weapon systems.
Instead we will examine some aspects of the current threat
to illustrate our emphasis on the decisional aspects of
the problem. We would submit that many of the factors con-
sidered will be pertinent throughout the next decade The
submarine is approximately a twenty year weapon systems and
the majority of the Soviet fleet is of post 1950 construc-
tion. It is possible, perhaps probable, that relatively
large numbers of these submarines will be transferred to
other flags during this period, but this may serve only to
make the threat more acute. However we would also caution
against extrapolating results of a current analysis for
other than current applications. Dr. TELLER has pointed out
the fallacy of designing a 1965 weapon system with a 1958
warhead, and it would be equally as easy to design a 1965
defense system against 1955 targets. Accordingly our
heuristic attempts at threat analysis will be directed to
serving short term decisions.
B. The Threat and the Purpose of the Analysis .
"IS THERE A SUBMARINE THREAT IN LIMI TED WAR ?"
Purpose: Assess current naval capabilities to
execute potential limited war missions.
Definition: Limited War: "A state of war involving
the threat or use of armed forces
but not involving direct attack on the
homeland of a major power."
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The intent of the definition is to restrict discus-
sion to the interval of the war spectrum of most likely
naval participation but excluding warfare wherein the
concept of nuclear deterrence is presumed valid. Action
range is difficult to define, but excludes any notion of
selective retaliation against a major power. The specific
nature of limitations is not necessarily predictable, but
could be geographic, nationalistic, or apply to allowable
weapons, and would likely involve all three of these fac-
tors. The indefiniteness exists because the limitations
are normally causistic rather than legalistic. Our first
concern will be with the general effect of such limita-
tions.
1. Effect of limitations on submarine operations :
a. Geographic limitations .
The submarine is capable of operating in almost
any waters regardless of relative military strength and
with no support requirements in the area of operations.
The density of a sustained threat is naturally dependent
upon transit regimes and logistic support in the active
theatre. But the very nature of limited war with implied
limited immediate goals tends to de-emphasize sustained
levels in favor of short term gains Geographic limita-
tions may be a distinct advantage, particularly if they
permit unrestricted transit operations The effect of
geographic factors may be quite dissimilar to that observed
in World War II. In the Battle of the Atlantic, submarines
31

operated in waters between two heavily defended and hos-
tile coasts. Intercepting ships as they converged to
their destinations meant facing increased defense levels.
Intercepting ships in mid ocean required a major search
effort. Contrariwise, a limited war will most likely occur
in areas of slight defensive capabilities, particularly in
the initial stages of the war. Possessing the initiative
permits prepositioning submarines to attack ships which
must funnel into the terminal area. Hence geographic
factors can reduce initial search requirements to the point
where a relatively small force can be extremely effective.
However, it is worth noting that any offensive submarine
action will normally increase the anticipated geographic
limits of the war. Unrestricted submarine warfare would
logically bring the war at least to the shores of the major
powers. This factor may or may not reduce the probability
of submarine employment, but should indicate the mutual
value of a clear definition of the geographic limits,
b. Nationality of Participants .
A war restricted to certain ethnic or national
groups imposes no real limitation on submarine operations.
It has been Soviet practice to furnish submarines to
limited war participants (e.g., China, N. Korea, Egypt) and
hence even positive identification as to type may be of
little value Further, the Soviets have provided volunteer
pilots and aircraft in almost every limited war to date.
Similar logic would "justify" open acknowledgement of
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submarine action. In fact, we can expect transfers of sub-
marines to be publicized to limit the aforementioned spread-
ing of geographical limits.
C. Allowable weapons .
Unrestricted submarine warfare by both U. S, and
Germany in World War II established a precedence for accept-
ing this as another form of conventional warfare. Consider-
ing factors of surprise, accuracy, target availability, vul-
nerability, and evasive capability, the submarine is probably
the most effective conventional weapon system that can be
employed against a maritime power. But still, the submarine
has not been considered an "allowable" weapon system in
limited wars to date. This restriction may have been caused
by a fear of enlargement of the conflict to a degree not in
consonance with the objectives. Thus we evaluate a second
order constraining factor: The submarine can operate ef-
fectively under expected weapon limitations, but the signi-
ficance of the submarine threat increases the likelihood
of an expansion of the war (for example causing a tactical
nuclear response at sea). This in turn would decrease the
likelihood of maintaining weapon limits in the land engage-
ments. But we must also consider the psychological impact
of nuclear weapons which is independent of weapon yields.
This factor plus an environment of mutual nuclear deter-
rence limits the probability that the U. S will ever
initiate a tactical nuclear response. The communists know
that this is U. S policy and hence we must recognize that
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there is no universal or automatic deterrence to sub-
marine warfare. Further, a nuclear response is not
necessarily a credible threat to a force not under Soviet
control.
There is an important timing relationship that should
be stressed with respect to weapon limitations. Restric-
tions are unilaterally determined by actions, not mutual
agreements. The level of warfare is quite likely to be
established by initial attack levels because this estab-
lishes a first upper bound. If incremental raises of
response, counter-response are observed, an upper bound may
never be established. Thus if submarine warfare is a lim-
ited war threat, we would assess it as much more probable
as an initial measure, rather than as a later expansion of
the war effort.
2. The magnitude of the threat
According to JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS there are at
least 25 nations operating over 900 submarines in the world
today. (A summary of these forces is listed in APP I for
the reader's perusal.) These forces exist because they
are considered part of the military forces necessary to
implement national policies, or at least to make such
policies credible Any restriction on the employment of
these submarines must be acceptable to the controlling
power or enforceable by an opposing power. Such restric-
tions do exist. As far as this writer could determine, a
submarine has not fired a weapon in anger since 1945. We
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have attributed this partly to a unilateral nuclear dom-
inance. This factor is of decreasing importance not only
because of the probability of multi-polar nuclear capa-
bility, but because a nuclear response cannot be applied to
the nationals of an unidentified attacker and is not a
realistic threat to many of the smaller nations possessing
submarines. It is realized that many of the submarines are
small coastal types and almost all are diesel/battery pow-
ered of limited submerged endurance. But we would empha-
size that the most likely limited war areas are within
submarine operational range of several communist and
"neutral" powers. Further, the size of an initial amphib-
ious or strike force is normally quite small. Two or three
submarines could be a significant threat to the major units
of these deployed forces. As a sustained threat to over-
seas logistic requirements, some of the submarine forces
are insignificant. But with the Soviet fleet viewed as a
replacement pool , the potential magnitude of any opponent
submarine force is considerably greater than the peak of
German submarine strength in WW II. Even without such
supplementation, any one of 24 nations could seriously dis-
rupt our initial limited war response efforts In a
thorough analysis, reasonably good estimates of expected
sustained levels in any particular theatre of operations
could be provided. For our purposes it is sufficient to
note a capability of pre-stationing a force large enough to




3. Geopolitical considerations affecting the threat
.
Experience to date would indicate that the most
likely limited war arenas lie under the pressure of the
Sino-Soviet heartland. This is the belt of under-developed,
militarily weak and politically unstable countries extend-
ing from Iran to Korea. The next most likely areas are
considered to be the new nations of Africa and the dictator-
ships of Central and South America. In almost all of these
areas, on-scene forces are relatively insignificant and
the requisite forces for aggression would largely be deter-
mined by the anticipated external response forces. Signi-
ficantly, almost any form of aid designed to directly op-
pose the aggression in these areas would be dependent upon
sea lines of communication. The capability to defend these
sea lines generally decreases as the terminal area is
approached. Thus potential submarine effectiveness would
be increased because targets would funnel into areas of
minimum defense.
Although there are many other political factors
the total war risk and the mutual value of sanctuaries are
considered the primary restraining factors pertinent to
submarine warfare. These factors are inter-related, but
it is considered worthwhile to discuss them separately:
a. Total war risk .
Any form of aggression represents an accept-
ance of some degree of risk relative to total war. If
containment is to be a credible policy, then the
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appropriateness and acceptability of total preemptive
action must be one possible course of action against ag-
gression If this risk did not exist gradual erosion
could almost guarantee eventual communist domination. Sub-
marine warfare is likely to increase this risk, but in
varying degree. The subject of Soviet willingness to en-
gage in nuclear blackmail is excellently presented in
GOODMAN'S book "The Soviet Design for a World State."
Therein, he presents a "cautious" conclusion that the
Soviet Union would aim for a policy of permanent non-
involvement in a general nuclear war. However, it is the
claim of this writer that conduct of submarine warfare of
itself would not violate this policy. To consider other-
wise is to provide any of at least 25 nations with the
capability of triggering a nuclear war in which the actual
initiator would not necessarily be identified as a partici-
pant. How or even whether submarines will be used would
depend upon the scale of warfare appropriate to the objec-
tive as well as an assessment of the total war risk,
b. The sanctuary concept .
Any definition of limited war establishes
sanctuaries, if only by implication. The nature of a
sanctuary, however, is not necessarily definable. It is
rarely static and must be continuously acceptable to the
antagonists. During the Korean war, strategic dominance
fostered a concept of a naval sanctuary. With at best a
nuclear stalemate, is there some selective response or
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mutual advantage that would make a sea sanctuary again
acceptable? The extent of the contiguous waters of the
major powers would appear to support the need for some type
of sea sanctuary. But it is doubtful that there would be
a total sea sanctuary. The threat of selective retaliation
in the aggressor's homeland represents a grave risk and is
perhaps not really credible. This is not to say that ships
will be considered legitimate targets in any limited war,
if only because of realistic mutual desire to minimize the
scale of warfare. We would rather stress that there should
be no expectation of a guaranteed sanctuary and hence the
potential threat must be anticipated and rational responses
evaluated.
4. Specific submarine threats in limited war .
Potential submarine missions exist that are com-
patible with almost any scale of warfare. The following
listing is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive:
a. Convert delivery of personnel and material.
b. Intelligence and reconnaissance.
c. Blockade enforcement.
d. Logistic interdiction.
e. Attack of naval forces
f Attack of shore targets.
A complete analysis would require examining the
total submarine potential as it effects accomplishment of
our objectives in limited war. For our purpose of illus-
tration, the discussion will be limited to just two poten-
tial applications:
a. Logistic Interdiction
This covers a broad spectrum as to types,
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methods and nationality of vessels attacked. In a geo-
graphically limited war the most probable form of inter-
diction would be in opposition to support forces in a
particular objective area Restriction of attacks according
to nationalities could easily be countered through use of
"Flags of convenience," hence is of dubious value. In a
weapon limited war, mine warfare might be employed with a
relatively low risk of increasing the scale of warfare.
However, in most areas this can be conducted with unsophis-
ticated weapon systems. It is therefore believed that the
most likely form of interdiction is with conventional tor-
pedo attacks. It is probable that there will be selectiv-
ity as to types of targets for the purpose of limiting the
total war risk. Sporadic sinkings of merchant shipping
must be anticipated as a possible action in limited war,
but the extensive interdiction required to nullify our
effective support is considered doubtful because of the
following factors that increase the general war risk:
(1) Maintenance of geographic limitations would be
difficult.
(2) An extended interdiction campaign would provide
time for planning and persuasion by those ele-
ments favoring total preemptive action.
(3) Positive identification of the attackers would
be almost inevitable
(4) This degree of warfare would justify a high
degree of alertness for retaliatory forces and
increased defensive measures which might appear




b. Attack naval forces .
Attacks on naval strike, amphibious and ser-
vice logistic forces might appear to introduce a highly
significant risk of invoking total war. Americans have
tended to react emotionally to submarine warfare, but the
increasing vulnerability of the continental U. S will
tend to subdue an emotional response From the communist
point of view, there may be less total war risk in a single
attack on our response forces than in a long siege of at-
trition. The former establishes a high upper limit but
it implies a willingness to stop short of total war. The
latter could lead to a series of incremental raises in
which either power could decide that the maximum raise was
inevitable and hence should be initiated To consider the
sinking of a carrier by the Soviets as reason for a nuclear
exchange is not necessarily rational, but even if valid
caution in the application of this principle is required.
The identification problem has not been solved and we must
recognize the possible advantages to a third power that
might accrue from an increased scale of U. S. -Soviet war-
fare. But what are the advantages relative to limited war
objectives that would favor a policy of attacking naval
forces? The loss of a single carrier out of an anticipated
two or three in the initial forces would be critical not
only in percent of vital air strength lost, but also in
limitations imposed by "after the fact" defensive measures
for the remaining carriers. If carrier air is the major
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troop air support, the total war risk may be rationalized
in favor of an immediate gain. But a more selective sub-
marine action may be a more general threat. For example,
restriction of attacks to the service logistics forces
may be just as effective, but evoke a less dramatic response.
The submarine would also encounter less initial defensive
opposition because the escort levels of the service forces
are low as compared to strike forces. Restriction of
attacks to just tanker targets could almost nullify the
effectiveness of our initial response forces. A CVA needs
aviation gasoline every 3-5 days and further the tanker
represents essential logistics for all our forces in the
field.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for considering
attacks on naval forces is the time criticality of limited
war response efforts. Our forces are limited, our lines of
communication are long and still we must respond before the
degree of enemy numerical superiority becomes intolerable.
It was two weeks before the Japan based division responded
to the Korean attack; a month before the U S based divisions
arrived in the theatre. At present force levels, naval ships
cannot transport more than one reinforced marine division
per ocean. According to recent press releases, it is
doubtful if available military air transport could lift one
full airborne division on a single trip basis. Both air and
sea transport forces are dependent upon ship tanker support.
The loss of a significant part of either tanker or transport
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ships could drastically limit reinforcement capability.
Militarily, delays would probably permit communist gains
and consolidations- Politically, such delays could pre-
clude any further action pertinent to original limited
war objectives. In most of the likely areas of aggression,
allied forces can only render invited support. Consider-
ing the political instability of most of these countries,
allied delays or losses could facilitate a "fait accompli"
establishment of a pro-communist or neutral government.
The value of such a result should indicate that submarine
attacks on naval response forces will be at least a con-
sidered course of action. If we assume a rational decision
process, a mutual willingness to minimize the total war
risk is indicated. Attacks on large numbers of ships
seem unlikely; in fact it is probable that no ships will
be attacked if the communists are relatively certain of
their objectives. However, isolated attacks particu-
larly against tankers and perhaps carriers of the initial
response forces could contribute significantly to the rapid
defeat of indigenous and response forces and hence must be
anticipated.
5. Tentative Conclusions of the Sample Threat Analysis ,
a. The threat of submarine warfare is constrained
in limited wars by an estimated mutual policy of using
minimum forces unilaterally determined as adequate to the
objective requirements.
b. Strategic retaliation is not a credible deter-
rence to submarine warfare. Mutual capability for nuclear
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warfare may permit an increased scale of conventional war-
fare providing some upper bound is communicated, credible
and acceptable.
c. Because of the time criticality and a mutual
need to establish limits in the scale of warfare, the most
credible submarine threat is one directed against the
initial naval response forces and their associated logistic
train.
6. General observations regarding the threat analysis .
Many readers will find this writer's conclusions
debatable. This is partly because of the heuristic nature
of the arguments, but primarily because it is not based on
the depth of analysis reguired for an important subjective
problem. However, any proper analysis is valid with respect
to the problem assumptions. Therefore, it is suggested
that the completion of the initial threat analysis should
be followed by discussions with the agency reguesting the
study. All of the remaining work is built on the threat
analysis as a foundation. Further, a range of acceptable
decisions to be considered should normally be dependent
upon a thorough understanding of the threat. It is also
guite probable that knowledge gained in a threat analysis






A measure of effectiveness should permit use of a valid
scale to assess proposed or implemented solutions relative
to the purpose of the problem. Hence we require meaningful
correlation factors that can be quantified
B. Dimensions .
Measures of effectiveness may be rates, ratios or
arbitrary quantities The important thing about dimensions
is that they should permit direct application of valid de-
cision criteria. However, the most obvious dimensions are
not necessarily the most valid. For example, units per
dollar may be suitable if our purpose is to select one of
two equipments designed to the same specifications and
available now. This same measure may be meaningless in a
design competition where time factors dominate cost con-
siderations. There is a grave danger of logic errors un-
less the true purpose is understood. This is particularly
pertinent when the statement of the problem appears to
signal a specific measure. To illustrate, in protecting
merchant shipping a common measure has been submarines sunk
related to time or merchant vessel sinkings. But as Glen
Camp (5) has stated, the basic problem is not underseas
warfare, but overseas transport. Hence submarine sinkings
are only one factor related to the needed measure of
resources delivered to that required Often it will be
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difficult to provide measures of effectiveness that can be
directly related to the primary purpose. In the past this
has been countered, perhaps in all honesty, by selecting
measures most favorable to the concept or solution pro-
posed. It is suggested that a more realistic result can be
obtained by requiring several measures and that this is
particularly important in predictive problems. For example,
separate measures may be required relative to cost, relia-
bility, and effectiveness to facilitate decisions which
must be at least partially subjective.
C. Determination .
Quantification is essential; hence in Operational
Analysis, factors are selected for which data is available
or obtainable. But how are values attained for complex
planning problems? Technological and political factors
limit any extrapolation of wartime experience. Operational
exercises are generally too unique to permit much valid
statistical inference and, further, realism therein must
frequently be sacrificed for specific training requirements.
What we propose is not necessarily a "good" answer but
believed to be the best available within the present "state
of the art." This is to develop measures of effectiveness
through simulation studies. Whether a completely computer-
ized or a man-machine simulation is used will depend upon
estimated accuracy and criticality of predictive factors.
Because of observability and repetivity, either is con-




D. Measures of Effectiveness for the Sample Problem .
The following measures would provide adequate refer-
ence for decision criteria for limited war missions:
1. Rate of delivery of fire power.
2. Rate of delivery of resources.
In a formal analysis these measures would have to be
evaluated under various assumptions of submarine threat
levels, defense postures., and requirements. The validity
of such measures could be tested through simulation. The
studies of the RAND corporation relative to limited war
could provide a logical context for this purpose. Despite
the fact that these studies have not included an active
submarine threat, they would provide the environmental
factors necessary to examine this threat as a component of
the entire limited war problem This would reflect, our
interest in the submarine threat not because of its destruc-
tive potential, but because of its contribution to the
nullification or defeat of our mission objectives. With
sufficient scope and repetition, it is believed that use of
such studies could produce relatively unbiased and usable
measures of effectiveness. We recognize that this view is
contrary to at least some truly expert opinion. In his
address as Retiring President of the Operations Research
Society of America, Charles HITCH of the RAND Corporation
stated: "I have yet to see a case where a hard problem
was convincingly solved by a game. . A game is not
46

analytic. You can't do much testing for sensitivity. You
can't afford to. You never know why the games came out as
they did." But with all its limitations, we would still
claim that gaming or man-machine simulation is the best
current research tool for determining measures of effective-
ness. Note that the comments that HITCH has made are also
pertinent to the real life "game" and are equally true for
any large scale exercise.
Can we be more precise as to procedures for determin-
ing measures of effectiveness? Let us consider an ideal
total measure of effectiveness which might be of the form:
"The chance the U. S. will achieve it's goals " If we are
to avoid problems of sub-optimization, an ideal measure for
the area being studied should measure the contribution with
respect to ultimate goals. Our measures should relate
decisions proposed in the specific area to consequent or
required decisions throughout the universe of related
problems. (As an obvious example, a decision to conduct
selective retaliation against the Chinese mainland should
not be measured just with reference to contributions in
specific limited war arena.) The limitations expressed by
HITCH are not being disputed. But we would suggest that
the relatively poor approximations obtainable by simula-
tion are more meaningful than such direct measures as cost
per kill. The direct measures we have suggested earlier
(e.g., rate of fire power delivered) provide a starting
point for the post-simulation analysis These may or may
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not be meaningful with respect to the desired outcome of
the limited war action. They will be of dubious value with
reference to outcomes outside the specific part of the
limited war spectrum being studied However, the analysis
of such initial measures could lead to factors which would
correlate decisions with outcomes. The initial factors
might also correlate directly. (For example, a specified
fire power delivery rate might correlate with X probability
of offensive action stopping at the ith parallel.)
We would stress that this procedure would not add to
the uncertainty of the entire analysis. The uncertainty
exists regardless of the methodology and we consider that
gaming or simulation provides the closest approximation to
predictable reality within the present state of the art.
Hence we recommend that the measures of effectiveness that
will be used for the decision process be experimentally
determined through analysis of simulated problems as cor-




ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION
A. Introduction .
Upon completion of the threat analysis, research ef-
forts should be directed to determine problem solutions.
In our sample problem, the decision requirements are indi-
cated in the second half of the definition:
"What action should be taken to minimize the threat ?"
We will further restrict the problem and consider just those
courses of action pertinent to the current threat. It is
believed that the listing of possible courses of action
should be as extensive as time permits. One subtle point
is often overlooked in such a listing: The course of action
must contribute to attainment of purpose of the organiza-
tion being served, but do NOT have to be courses of action
for that organization. Even if one excludes non-military
measures, this point is considered valid. The following
incomplete listing of courses of action pertinent to the
sample problem is illustrative of the scope intended:
1. Establish a United Nations Naval Response Force,
2. Increase airborne logistic capability.
3. Develop a sub-surface logistics capability.
4. Conduct offensive anti-submarine warfare.
5. Disengage in the specific limited war theatre.
6. Increase size of forces committed to reduce per-
centage losses.




8. Increase ASW protective forces
9. Increase deployment of response forces and their
logistic support.
10. Provide only indirect support
Only two of these possible courses of action will be
considered for further analysis. However, because of cur-
rent emphasis, a word should be said about increased air-
borne logistics capability. That this capability is desir-
able is not questioned, but we would point out that the
logistics aspects involve much more than aircraft procure-
ment. Airborne logistics forces require sophisticated
terminal facilities and are critically dependent upon
terminal and/or enroute fuel stocks. This implies depend-
ence upon seaborne transport. Further, if the objective is
of such import that ships have become targets, it is a
dubious assumption that aircraft will be immune from
attack
o
B. Evaluating Courses of Action .
One examines possible courses of action with an intent
to determine which are "better" or "best." But by what
criteria do we assign these label values? In simple game
theory (say two person, zero sum) there are several exist-
ing criteria. We illustrate some of these in APP. Ill, but
note that there is no known criteria for selection of a
criteria. If one wishes to be ultra conservative, or to
maximize expected gain, or minimize risks, - there are
theoretical procedures, but even these are dependent upon
outcome values being "provided." Considering unknown but
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time dependent values in a predictive planning problem,
it is doubtful that any analysis would approach a clear
cut optimum. But by relating courses of actions to deci-
sion requirements and limitations, usable results can be
obtained. Some proposals may be eliminated as not being
in consonance with national policy, but the majority will
require some measure of comparison. We earlier referred
to the use of measures of effectiveness which might provide
such information as the relative costs of the courses of
action. In addition, a probabilistic measure must be
provided as an aid to decisions. The various courses of
action must be related to the possibility of obtaining a
desired outcome and also the probability that a particular
course of action will result in a different outcome than
that intended. Some subjectivity is unavoidable in these
probability measures, but the degree of error considered
acceptable must be measured against the cost of a wrong
decision. The discussion of the two possible courses of
action that follows is illustrative only of the prelimi-
nary steps toward the extensive scope and depth of a formal
analysis. The first is presented because it describes a
course of action outside the control of the organization
being served, but still contributing to its objectives.
The second is intended to illustrate how a cursory analysis
can indicate specific weapon system requirements.
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C. Illustrative Analysis of Courses of Action.
1. Develop a United Nations' Naval Response Force .
Is this course of action related to accomplish-
ment of U. S. limited war objectives in the face of a
potential submarine threat? Certainly not necessarily, for
a positive contribution would be limited to those cases
wherein the objectives of the U. S. and the United Nations
coincided or were at least parallel But we would claim
that there is a mutual interdependence for survivability
between these two organizations. The National Goals devel-
oped by the President's Bi-partisan commission are in con-
sonance with the United Nations Charter, as indeed they must
be if we are to remain a treaty member of that organization.
There are basic conflicts in willingness to adopt various
methods to implement goals and deeper limitations resultant
from the efforts of both Communism and the West to use the
United Nations to pursue their own aims. However, we would
note that there is freguent agreement relative to main-
tenance of the status guo, if only for purpose of stability.
The establishment of a naval force offers at least the pos-
sibility of a stabilizing influence in many otherwise bi-
polar environments and hence should be worthy of considera-
tion.
a. Application .
The creation of a United Nations Naval Response
Force is proposed to provide a force in being to cope with
low scale incidents and aggressions. Its application would
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be primarily limited to those areas in which the major
powers are willing to oppose instability and accept the
status quo. It may seem incongruous that the communists
would support a stabilizing force when exploitation has
been such a useful tool for them. They might not, but in
opposing this concept they might lose a propaganda battle.
We will attempt to show that they might accept this force
because there are real advantages to both the Eastern and
Western powers in its potential application throughout
the globe.
b. Why a naval force ?
We believe that a naval force has the follow-
ing advantages as an enforcement agency for the United
Nations
:
(1) Could be established with more celerity
and less opposition than any other form of permanent U. N.
military force, if only because it would not be developed
under the auspices of any single nation,,
(2) Could operate independent of bloc align-
ment. Almost all U. N. military actions have been depend-
ent upon the U. S for transport and other logistic sup-
port with resultant charges that such actions have been
dominated by the Western powers.
(3) Could be operated as a coordinated force
without loss of national identity of participants, thus
facilitating rotation and replacement of units.
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(4) Could readily be deployed to likely
areas of aggression without immediate need for invitation
or encroachment of foreign territory.
(5) Could provide a relatively sophisticated
self-supporting weapon system almost regardless of the
facilities available in the immediate limited war theatre.
(6) Would be readily identified as a United
Nations Force with inherent prestige that would provide at
least a degree of immunity from attack, certainly greater
than expected by a national vessel used in transport.
c. Composition and Control .
The control of this force would be critical
from the viewpoint of the major powers. We believe that
political control would have to be vested in the Security
Council with consequent veto power over its actions. It is
suggested that military control be vested in a commander
selected by the Secretary Generals Use of officers from a
middle power such as Sweden, India or Ireland has been
acceptable for the U N. land forces and such countries
could furnish a naval commander suitable to the major powers.
We would suggest that the proposed force be
highly mobile and deployed to probable areas of operation.
Relatively small forces can be effective if they are present
at the initial crisis, or preferably before the crisis can
develop to an armed conflict stage. A typical force could
be built around two light carriers; one a helo transport,
the second providing a tactical support air group.. Weaponry
should be closely controlled and restricted to light con-
ventional arms appropriate to police type action. The
force should have an integral mobile logistic support group.
The major powers could furnish naval units. For example
the U. S. could provide carriers from the fleet reserve and
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perhaps the Russians could provide transport helicopters
To preclude even a semblance of bloc alignment, the troop
and tactical air support personnel should be furnished by
the smaller or neutral countries
d. Employment .
This would not represent a force designed to
enforce law and order to the extent that it would make
feasible the outlawing of war because it could not oppose
a major power. It could help to overcome the present
power vacuum in the Indian Ocean and provide a stabiliz-
ing influence for the African continent. Application in
disputes between nations of Central and South America may
be appropriate. In this area, the force might work both
for and against U. S. objectives. It might help to contain
"Castroism," while simultaneously limiting the probability
of a successful revolt against CASTRO. There are many
areas of potential application of such a force in the South
Pacific. For example, as a stabilizing influence in the
dispute between the Dutch and Indonesians. In the future
may be a role in replacement of the Taiwan Patrol Force,
particularly if Red China is admitted to the United Nations
e. Reasons for U. S. Support :
(1) Would reduce the spectrum of war in which
a U. S response is required. If the use of our military
forces for police duties could be eliminated , or even
reduced, it would be possible to tailor military capability
more closely to specific types of warfare.
(2) Should limit need for military aid programs,
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particularly to the smaller nations, and hence free funds
for economic development.
(3) Would have psychological and propaganda
value in limiting exploitation of the U. S. as the "Imper-
ialist Aggressor.
"
(4) Would limit need for direct U. S. Commit-
ments in support of many of the smaller nations.
f . Reasons for Soviet Support :
It is probable that there are few direct ad-
vantages to the Soviet Union, at least as far as attainment
of communist long range objectives are concerned. Such a
force could be acceptable to the Soviets and the following
listing is intended to make such acceptance credible:
(1) Desire to minimize at least some conflicts
because of the inherent total war risk.
(2) Preference for United Nations action rather
than unilateral or Western action.
(3) Propaganda value. It might be difficult
for the communists to directly oppose the creation of such
a force in the light of their "peace offensive" and the
possible adverse reaction among the uncommitted nations
(4) Prestige value. The communists have a
significant naval force that has been largely constrained
to operating areas contiguous to communist territory.
There would be significant prestige value in even limited
participation as a component of the U S. forces.
(5) Provide an additional means for controlling
independent action by other nations of the communist bloc.
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(6) Provide an environment appropriate to
economic warfare, non-military subversion, and at least
potential communist expansion, while minimizing risk of
offensive action of the Western powers.
g. Advantages to the minor countries :
(1) Limit the need for committing themselves
to either of the major power blocs.
(2) Provide military support without the
threat of colonialism.
(3) Permit significant reduction in defense
budgets.




The implementation of a United Nations Naval
Response Force would be a difficult task. Just development
of procedures for command and control tactically in a
multi-lingual environment is a formidable reguirement. Ob-
taining agreement as to strategic control, acceptable lim-
itations in composition and employment, logistic and finan-
cial support would reguire astute negotiating skill and
determination. But none of these are insurmountable prob-
lems and are probably no more complex than the nuclear
control problem being debated in Geneva. The value of a
force in being, capable of precluding some and limiting
other even low scale aggressions should be worth a consider-
able effort. A naval response force could be created in a
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relatively short time, could have significant application
in limiting the threat of war in at least one area of the
spectrum, and permit a greater degree of concentration on
measures appropriate to other threats. It is recommended
as a form of "preventative medicine" in limiting the
threat of submarine warfare in limited wars.
2. Illustrative course of action: Increase ASW pro-
tective measures .
a Introduction .
It may be argued that we do anticipate this
threat and have provided ASW protective forces. However
increasing unit weapon system costs and relatively large
increases in naval missions in strategic warfare have
resulted in decreased ASW capability. It is believed that
even a casual analysis will support the following conten-
tions pertinent to U. S. ASW capability in limited war.
(1) ASW forces are predominantly located in
areas contiguous to the continental U. S. This is presum-
ably to provide a measure of defense against a possible
FBM threat. However, paper, simulated and fleet exercises
have shown that existing capability is slight with respect
to even a surfaced launched missile attack. More pertinent
is the fact that even a dominant ASW capability would not
preclude a strategic threat to the U. S
(2) Our deployed ASW forces are too limited
to provide significant protection for both fleet and log-
istic support forces. This is particularly true with
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regard to air ASW capability, but even our surface escorts
are at a premium. The problems of block obsolescence,
fixed budgets with consequent inadequate new construction,
and increases in the number of tension areas would permit
an expectation of little improvement.
(3) In the past and at present, we have
accepted a calculated risk in the mode of operation of our
carrier and logistic support forces. From the Korean war
to the Lebanon landings, our strike and logistic forces
have frequently had only token ASW protection. This is not
to be considered a criticism, as the calculations have to
date proved to be a valid assessment of the existing risk.
We would stress that this threat of submarine warfare may
increase as we approach coequal deterrence. Unless ade-
quate ASW protection is immediately available, our deployed
forces may be rendered ineffective,
b. Implementation .
Analysis of this one course of action is not
only worthy of, but has been the subject of, many opera-
tions research studies. Such studies normally require
initial assumptions regarding the magnitudes of the threat
areas of probable submarine employment, types of submarines
and weapons anticipated, and minimum acceptable levels of
protection in limited war movements. These assumptions
must be based on a correlation between the value of the
objective and acceptable threat levels. Herein we assume
a relatively small force geographically restricted, and
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with missions in direct support of the limited war objec-
tives. Because the initial movement of response forces
is considered most critical, comment will largely be
restricted to protective measures in the transit phase:
(1) Passive measures: Mobile Sovereignty Con-
cept .
The transit area will normally include in-
ternational waters free to submarines as well as ourselves.
Can we delineate permissible attack situations without vio-
lating the traditional freedom of the seas? It would be
an almost untenable threat if transit forces were restricted
to mere tracking until an attack occurred. But if all de-
tected submarines were to be attacked, regardless of range
from the force, unrestricted submarine warfare would be
invited. It is suggested that a level of submarine warfare
be assumed that is in consonance with limited war objec-
tives. If conventional warfare is anticipated in the
theatre, this might represent a restriction to use of
conventional torpedos. The submarine's freedom of action
could then be limited by a declaration of a principle of
mobile sovereignty to apply to a six mile radius of a ship
flying the Uo So Flag. (This range was our compromise
position in the recent territorial waters conference.
)
This declaration could be enforced by a stated policy of
attacking any submerged submarine within this radius of
our "moving territorial waters " This type of unilateral
declaration is not unprecedented in the realm of power
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politics, and is not on a total war risk level with the
nuclear blackmail statements that followed the U-2 epi-
sode. This position on sovereignty would provide our on-
scene commanders with authority commensurate with respon-
sibilities. Whereas under existing policy, there is a
possibility that a commander might order an attack in broad
self-defense, the mobile sovereignty concept would provide
a more certain response with increased deterrence effects.
It would at least preclude granting submarines complete
freedom of action in tracking and gaining position. This
advantage should be carefully weighed (at the time of the
specific incident) against the possibility that such a
policy would encourage an otherwise dormant submarine
threat. But if this policy is adopted, what effect will it
have on our ASW defense requirements? It will necessitate
increased emphasis on response capability of close in de-
fense elements. The effectiveness of fixed wing aircraft
in this type of defense will be limited. Most of their
detection and tracking systems are severely hampered by
the close proximity of surface units. A defense in depth
concept would still be required for warning and harassment
but a six mile attack radius would accentuate the need for
a very rapid response-attack capability.
(2) Active Protective Measures .
Regardless of the mobile sovereignty
concept discussed above, it is believed that nature of
limited war will encourage a different type of submarine
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warfare than that of WW I or WW II. At least initially,
the close in threat may predominate. First because the
threat has not been confirmed and later because of a de-
sire to maintain geographic limits. The following active
measures are considered pertinent to the limited war
threat
:
(a) Increase detection capability
against a close in submerged target. Quantity in short
range detection systems is considered preferable to a few
long range systems. Operation of search helicopters and
VTOL attack platforms from all major ships is recommended
as an interim measure. It is believed that the next step
should be development of multiple search capability for
surface escorts. This is based on a disbelief in an early
"breakthrough" in novel detection measures, and with con-
tinued dependence upon sound, the surface escorts provide
the only current sustained all-weather ASW platforms.
(b) Provide improved non-nuclear ASW
weapons. The fact that our ASW forces are depending in-
creasingly on nuclear kill capability has been widely
publicized. However, the employment of such weapons may
frequently be undesirable or unacceptable. Consider one
conceivable result of the U. S. initiating the use of
nuclear weapons in a limited war: Selective retaliation
by limiting nuclear weapons to seaborne forces. Comparing
the vulnerability of ships to nuclear versus conventional
weapons, this type of raise may be extremely unprofitable.
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Perhaps of more immediate concern is the fact that nuclear
weapons cannot be employed in close defense of our ships.
Further, there are many areas where use of nuclear weapons
at sea is just not practicable because of potential or real
danger to friendly or neutral personnel, material and
resources. Security considerations preclude explicit com-
ment on required improvements, but the problem is believed
largely one of restricted funds for conventional weapon
systems due to increasing cost of more sophisticated wea-
ponry.
(3) Increase deployed ASW defense systems.
(a) Develop a portable sonar to permit
use of transport and SAR helicopters in supplementing the
screen.
(b) Evaluate the hydrofoil platform for
close in support of fleet and service forces.
(c) Analyze current deployment of ASW
units in environment of ICBM parity to determine optimum
distribution of forces between CONUS defense missions and
overseas support of strategic and limited war forces.
3. Illustrative Courses of Action: Addendum .
The measures suggested relate primarily to obtain-
ing increased effectiveness within current limitations.
Unless there is a significant change in the Naval Budget,
the capability to wage limited war, particularly with con-
ventional weapons, will decrease. The Navy has been as-
signed a new mission of developing a primary strategic
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strike system in Polaris without a commensurate increased
share of the Defense Budget Approximately 75% of the
active fleet is of WW II construction and increased cost
of new construction has prevented adequate replacement
programs within present budgetary constraints. It is not
an overstatement to say that it is impossible to wage
limited war without adequate naval strength Yet if one
believes at all in the stated National Policy of deterrence,
limited war is the most likely form of continued communist
aggression. (At the time of this writing, there were four
active limited wars. ) The most significant initial course
of action relative to the limited war submarine threat is
to present a real sense of its magnitude to the Executive
branch, the Congress and the American people. Unless the
Navy's capability is significantly increased, the realistic
U, S„ response to aggression may be restricted to strate-
gic strike or not. In the light of the communist doctrine
of inevitable success and the results of their erosion
tactics to date, a "strike second" deterrent force cannot
prevent communist domination. This is not a problem of
inter-service rivalry, for in limited war the services are





THE DECISION AND SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction .
Let us review briefly the procedural aspects we have
discussed thus far in the application of the "scientific
method." The most critical phase of the entire research
is in obtaining a clear understanding of the problem
definition. We must be concerned whether the stated prob-
lem is the one most pertinent to the purpose of the re-
search, and perhaps just as frequently, whether the stated
research is pertinent to the real problem The constraints
of the problem must be understood with respect to the de-
cision limits, for the goal must be usable guidelines to
decision. The definition of the problem may appear to in-
dicate an obvious measure of effectiveness. Ideally, we
would desire a measure that is directly related to the
purpose. In practice, the specific measure of effectiveness
may depend upon the measurable aspects of an analytic,
simulated or experimental analysis and with such indirect
measures, a positive correlation with the ideal measure
must be determined The next step in the research was to
determine those feasible actions which would permit attain-
ment of problem objectives Then these various "solutions"
would have to be compared quantitatively through use of
the measures of effectiveness. Now let us assume that
these processes can be implemented in a subjective problem
how is the decision made to implement or even accept the
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proffered solution (s)? This question leads to the final
topic of this paper. But first we would pose a few more
questions for the reader's perusal. What should be the
role of the scientist in this process? Should he press
for adoption of the product of his research and then be
absolved of all responsibility once the "decision-maker"
has said an appropriate "Yes" or "No"? Should his product
be an input to a set of larger analysis ever seeking an
"ultimate" problem? Should he alone be qualified to be the
decision maker in this era of complex and ever expanding
technology? One more question - who is he, this research
scientist, a professional research executive, or an anony-
mous committee of "experts"? We will not claim to provide
the answers in the discussion that follows, but assert
that they are valid questions that should be asked by the
users of scientific research.
B. Mathematical Decision Techniques .
SALVESON (9) lists the following as being illustrative






5. Statistical Decision Theory.
6. Design of Experiments & Multi-variate Analysis.
7. Logic.
As SALVESON points out, all of these techniques have in-
herent limits in their application and to date have been
used in rather specialized decision processes. The last
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item is involved in all others, and even a well defined
problem will generally require some dependence on intuition
hunch and judgment. This writer interpreted SALVESON'
s
article to claim that these latter subjective factors be-
came the final arbiters. We do not presume to quarrel
with this viewpoint, but we would suggest a more predominant
role for logic and claim that good intuition hunch or judg-
ment should withstand its test. We would also add to his
list what we would consider a primary technique for sub-
jective problems, that which can include all other tech-
niques listed: simulation. We will attempt to relate its
application in the next section.
C. Simulation as an Aid to Decisions .
For subjective problems, what the formalist calls
"decision-making under uncertainty," we would advocate
primary reliance on simulation. The simulation may be com-
pletely computerized, but at the present state of the art,
it is considered preferable to illuminate significant
decision points through use of man-machine simulation. We
recognize the advantage of speed, replication and cost in
a completely computerized simulation, but believe such
advantages are offset by the concealment critical para-
meters. With even a student's limited exposure, the
following sequence is all too prevalent: "This is the best
parameter I could obtain for the model. If 'someone'
doesn't consider it valid, give me another and I'll run
it through the computer." (But the report, from graphic
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trends to final conclusions is frequently dependent upon
the validity of the used parameters.... Of course, this
may be unavoidable, but our main objection is that such
dependence is rarely indicated in the conclusions. ) We
believe that the requirement for observed man-made deci-
sions will do the following:
1. Indicate the importance of input parameters in
relation to ultimate decisions.
2. Permit not only evaluation, but frequently devel-
opment, of those measurable factors that are indicative
or can be correlated with the fundamental purpose of the
problem. In other words, permit experimental determina-
tion of measures of effectiveness.
3. Facilitate analysis of the logic pertinent to
selection of decisions.
4. Permit selection and evaluation of unique deci-
sions by providing a consequential environment relatable
to their implementation.
We would emphasize that no technique or procedure can
change a decision problem under certainty to a causistic
analysis. What we do claim is that man-machine simulation
can provide the best available decision criteria, facili-
tate relation of specific decision to larger and inter-
related problems, and provide usable confidence limits for
subjective judgment.
D. Applicability to the Sample Problem .
The RAND corporation has been the leading proponent of
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the use of man-machine simulation techniques for limited
war analysis. Their work would provide a logical context
for analysis of the sample problem and would further serve
to relate this problem to its larger background. Certain
assumptions would have to be made regarding the specific
scope of the threat and the defined limits of the war.
Simulation would be required for several threat levels to
provide usable guidelines for decisions pertinent to hard-
ware development tactics and strategy However, with suf-
ficient replication, such studies could provide decision
criteria at less cost and based on more realistic experience
than could be attained in actual exercises. That such
studies be carried out is one of the primary recommendations
of this paper.
E. The "Decision-Maker "
In the introduction to this chapter, we asked some
questions that focused attention on the "decision-maker."
This was intended to reveal a "straw man." We would first
make a plea against decision by committee, if only because
we believe in the inseparability of decision and responsi-
bility. We would further claim that it just doesn't work.
As a not atypical example, we would recommend BALLENTINE's
book, "U. S. Navy Logistics in World War II," wherein he
describes a series of committees which could not decide on
or implement effective measures to solve the then current
logistic problems of the Pacific Fleet. A more direct
objection is in the fact that a committee decision
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originates with an individual, and we see no logical reason
for his anonymity. Regarding the question of "who" as
related to the "decision-maker/ 1 we believe there has been
too much emphasis on the requisite professional background.
At least the gross effects of the expanding technology are
not beyond the capacity of an effective leader. Consider
the law engineering and advertising backgrounds of recent
effective Secretaries of Defense, or the military back-
grounds of the Director of Manhattan Project, the Nuclear
Submarine Program and Project Polaris. We believe in the
fundamental capacity of our system to continue to provide
effective leadership which is primarily indicated by a
capacity to make "good" decisions. What is required is the
continued development of effective communications to and
from the research scientists so that their results will be
a usable input to the decision process. We would claim
that the use of man-machine simulation facilitates this
communication process by providing a meaningful display of
decisions and decision consequences That this technique
can also identify those with capacity to make effective
decisions in complex predictive problems may indicate a





























To preclude any classification requirements these fig-
ures have been obtained from Jane's of 1958. They provide






As far as this writer has been able to ascertain,
every dissertation on decision theory has explicitly or
implicitly depended upon a concept of utility or value.
Any rational concept of a decision, even a decision not to
decide, must involve an assessment of potential outcomes.
But how is this to be accomplished? We have earlier indi-
cated that Utility or Value Theory is in the embryo stage
and formal applications have been limited to extremely
specialized problems. The theory has inherent restrictions
related to the lack of a quantitative comparison between
utilities and the lack of a time dependence relationship.
The application of the theory requires consistent error-
free behavior with a single decision criteria of maximizing
expected utility in a probabalistic sense. The usefulness
of the theory has been questioned when the outcome can be
measured in terms of dollars and has been considered almost
irrelevant when the outcomes must be expressed in qualita-
tive terms. We would not dispute the existence of severe
limitations with respect to the theory. But we would claim
that the first step to overcoming these limitations is the
development of a measurable concept of utility. We stress
the word concept rather than any connotation of accuracy.
A first order concept toward utility now exists in the form
of a rank-order. The next step may not be a specific
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dimensioning to permit intra-utility comparison, but in-
stead some second or third order concept. The purpose of
this appendix is to review briefly some psychological con-
cepts that may have an application in the development of
such a theory, and in any event will illustrate that a
practical capacity for measurement of at least some sub-
jective factors does exist. We will first digress to re-
view briefly the formal aspects of a utility function and
then proceed with a discussion of GUTTMAN' s article:
"Principle Components of Scalable Attitudes." (6)
B. Utility Concepts .
Utility theory is usually developed from an axiomatic
treatment of a binary preference relation. In elementary
*
form, we will assume the universe of discourse is com-
pletely specified by three outcomes: A, B, and C. Let
A B mean that A is not preferred to B. A B mean
A B and B A, or the subject is indifferent between
A and B. Let ApB mean that the outcome will be A with
probability p, and the outcome will be B with probability
(1-p). (The probabilities will frequently be subjective.)
Then a subject who has a consistent utility function will
display preference according to the following axioms:
1. A-^=-B or B^A (Comparability)
2. If A -^ B and B-^-C, then A"^=- C (Transitivity)
3. If A = B then CpA = CpB
4. If A — B and B •£=. C then there exists a unique
p such that B - ApC
*Development similar to that of MARSCHAK IN Ref (6).
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The first three axioms are intuitively related to our
concept of consistency. The fourth require-s—a- behavior
that is consistent with probabilistic expectation. By let-
ting A and C represent the most and least preferred out-
comes, assign a utility value of 1 to A, to C, then by
axiom 4 the utility of any outcome B where C ^=Bf=.A, will
be equal to p, or U(B) = P. By induction, we can describe
the utility for any element of a countable set of ordered
outcomes by a one to one correspondence with the interval
of the real line between zero and one - PROVIDING THE
PROBABILITIES ARE KNOWN . This is essentially the Bernoulli
development. We could have started with an assumption that
the utilities were "provided" and derived the probabilities
such procedure being the Bayes approach. According to
MARSHAK (6) , there is a set of behavior rules developed by
Ramsey to conceptually determine both subjective probabil-
ities and utilities by observing decisions. But it is our
understanding that regardless of the approach, practical
application of utility theory has been limited to pair-wise
comparisons. In this sense, it is meaningful to state
u (A) ^~ u (B) ^r u (C) , but it is not meaningful to state
[u (A) - u(B)]^- [u(B) - u(C).]. (u(K) is utility function
described above.) We will not presume to provide a scale
permitting the latter type of comparison. However, we
believe that the idea of scale analysis in psychological
theory could be extended to make such comparisons at least
conceptually feasible. For this reason and to illustrate
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actual subjective measurement, we will attempt to summarize
some of GUTTMAN' s theoretical and experimental work in
Scale Analysis,
C. " Principle Components of Scalable Attitudes ."
Although scale analysis is applicable in a much wider
sense, we will limit our discussion to attitudes and to
psychological types who are consistent in the sense derived
in the previous section for a binary preference relation-
ship. Our primary task will be to develop a potential for
application in utility theory, but we will follow GUTTMAN'
s
lead and attempt to display the interplay between mathe-
matics and psychology.
1. Mathematical Background .
We will restrict our universe of discourse to
dichotomous items and assume that these items can be ex-
pressed as linear functions of an infinite number of com-
ponents, which we will label X. An attitude will be de-
fined as a conceptual "machine" which can weigh the X. such-
that for any dichotomous guestion J^
_
w X
-f- a = or 1
\~i i i i
always, where w. is a weighting factor and a. an additive
i i
constant. (This constant serves only to shift the origin
and is irrelevant to identical scale types and hence will
not be considered further. ) The X. have been identified
i
in statistical theory as principal axis and in psycholog-
ical theory as principal components. The reason for the
term principal stems from the property that the X, can be
ordered in a magnitude sense such that X. >-X„ . . «• > x
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and ^>w.x. ^ )> w.x., where m is a "small" number. We> ,
Af J J
thus sense that X is somehow more "important" than any
*-i
l x
subsequent X We will not a ttempt to identify the psy-
chological character of X initially. Instead, we will
assume that this one component is sufficient for purposes
of rank ordering attitudes amongst some psychological groups
or scale types. Now psychological techniques exist for
weighting a set of dichotomous questions for purposes of
rank ordering attitude according to content (i.e., more or
less favorable). Hence it would appear that one could use
the rank order ings and the weightings from the psychological
tests to determine the values of the first principal compon-
ent for each sub-group. GUTTMAN proceeded on the assumption
that this component should be a least squares metric in the
sense of minimizing the difference between members of each
sub-group, thus maximizing the difference between sub-
groups. To illustrate, assume that n attitude groups had
been correctly identified by psychological testing. The
solution of the weighting equations for the least squares
metric relative to the first principal component led to a
(1) (2) (n)
set of n "solutions," say X. X ..X, that could be
ordered so that X was the most consistent and X, was
least consistent with reference to the least squares metric.
Now when these "solutions" were plotted against the orig-
inal rank order, the resulting curves exhibited some
peculiarly consistent properties. X was a monotoni-
(2)
cally increasing curve, X was U or J shaped with one
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bend, X^ had two bends, X, had three bends and for each
successive curve, there was an interleaving of bending
points, that is, each successive bend occurred on either
side of the previously indicated maximum or minimum (refer
Fig. 1). The mathematical laws relative to oscillating
principal components for eguations of this type had been
developed several years prior to this work. What GUTTMAN
has contributed is first a recognition that the "solution"
developed from the first principal component could be iden-
tified as the principal components; second, provided a
psychological concept for the first four components and
third, provided experimental verification for the theory.
We found the concept of principal components difficult to
understand and believe it is best illustrated by examples.
The first attitude we will consider concerns an individual's
disposition toward communism. We restrict our attention to
that class of individuals which can be consistently ordered
with reference to preference, that is to say there is a
perfect underlying continum scale such that conceptually




Now let us assume that we propose a set of n dichotom-
ous questions to a group of respondents. These questions
will divide the group into at most n-fl sub-groups. For




















Is Communism Good? 30% 70%





As illustrated, all respondents would be divided into at
most three groups: O-a , a-b, and b-100. Inductively it
can be shown that by increasing the number of questions to
n, at most n *+- 1 intervals will result. Now let us weight
each respondent's answer to each question as a function of
his answer to all others, such that there will be a maximum
difference between sub-groups, and a minimum difference
within subgroups. We will identify the mean of each sub-
group as X . The solutions of the equations for the least
squares metric of these X would lead to the n -+- 1 principal
components, if we knew the population parameters. Unfor-
tunately, there was no way of devising a sample to un-
biasedly estimate these parameters. But GUTTMAN realized
that a bending point was independent of the metric. That
is stretching or condensing a curve will not change a
unique bending point. Hence, if the second principal com-
ponent could be identified and rank ordered, it could be
applied independent of the metric. An assumption was made
that this component could be identified as intensity. The
0-100 attitude percentile metric was arbitrary and not
indicative of a zero point in the sense of positive and
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negative attitudes. The idea of a zero point led to an
assumption that as the interval from the zero point in-
creased, one should become more positive or negative - hence
more intense. Techniques were developed for rank ordering
intensity. Experiments were conducted and the predicted
U or J shape confirmed. In Fig. 2, the "bow" represents
the regression of intensity on content and the arrow the
regression of content on intensity. Of course statistical
scatter has been removed, but the important feature of the
analysis is that a zero point for content is obtained from
empirical rank ordering of content and intensity and since
medians were used in regression, the zero point will not vary
significantly with sampling of items.
Let us digress for a moment from GUTTMAN and substitute
utility for attitude throughout his experimental procedure.
We will ask a set of questions to permit ranking of outcomes
and a second set to rank intensity (say of desire) . This is
at least conceptually possible. According to GUTTMAN' s work,
these two rankings should permit identification of a prac-
tical zero point of the utility scale that would be independ-
ent of the sample questions, assuming of course that the
items were from a scalable universe.
Returning to the article under discussion, the mathemat-
ics indicated that one should attempt to identify psycholog-
ically the third, fourth, and higher principal components.
The third component was discovered experimentally and labeled
"Closure." The idea behind this component is that it should









negative) within each of the subgroups on either side of the
zero point Probably the most significant aspect of closure
is that it was found experimentally to refer to a universe of
universes. Thus the third principal component expresses the
totality of comparisons among the universes. It is worthwhile
to illustrate this concept with the actual research from which
it was developed. The basic attitude was toward staying in the
Israel Army after the war. A cross section of the army was given
questionnaires covering several types of post war plans (e.g.
,
remain in professional army, return to school, starting a
business, etc.). For each of these areas the content and
intensity plots were developed and a zero point on the content
scale determined. But the total of those with positive post war
plans added to about 150%. The problem was then given an in-
dividual with positive post war plans in two or more areas,
which will he ultimately choose? Another set of questions had
been asked which did not relate to a specific area, but were
of a general type with answers to be checked like: "I have
definitely made up my mind." ... to "I have definitely not
decided." From this general set of questions the content and
intensity curves developed a zero point and the content scale
was plotted against each identified post war plan. The result-
ant regression curves had the two bends predicted for the
third principal component. (Fig 3). Each post war plan
yields a sub-universe of its own intensity function and zero
point, but all of the scales have the same third principal














Army, the closure further subdivides the positive and negative
subgroups. But what is more significant is that the closure
metric permits inter-scale comparison between the subgroups
indicated for each post war plan. Hence a psychological metric
was discovered that is comparable from universe to universe.
In the actual experiments, the type in the highest ordered
group of each universe was taken as a minimum and the top two
taken as a maximum and a prediction halfway between the two
proportions taken as the optimum prediction for implementing a
post war plan The sample size was 2600 and on the two plans
that could be verified a year later (staying in the army and
going into agriculture) , the accuracy was within one percent.
(Consider the significance of predicting a subjective factor
to within 1%'. )
Consider the potential application to Utility Theory.
Through examining a set of universes of outcomes and one set
of closure content and intensity, it is conceivable that one
could develop an intra-utility metric (albeit approximate) for
an individual. The same procedure could lead to an inter-
person comparison of utilities, at least in a gross sense.
The success in identifying the third principal component
led to attempts at a psychological interpretation of the
fourth principal component. A starting point was indicated
by the existence of prejudice among negative types, shouldn't
there be similar prejudice among positive types? An experi-
ment was designed to explore this concept and resulted in the
predicted curve with three bends when plotted against the
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content percentile. This component has been psychologically
identified as Involution. This is meant to suggest a turning
inward to distinguish between those who are turning the atti-
tude over and over within themselves and non-involution, those
whose minds are at rest with respect to the attitude. It is
important to note that involution is specific to underlying
content and not related to other universes as was closure
With regard to Utility, the fourth component appears to
have no direct application. However, involution might be
determined by such questions as: "Are you debating with your-
self with respect to the utilities you have indicated?" Thus
with this component, additional sub-groups for both intra- and
inter-person utility could be conceptually developed to in-
crease the accuracy of the individual utility scales.
D. Summary .
We recognize that even if the approach to a utility scale
suggested here is valid, it would still have severe limitations,
Although the mathematics indicate that the effects of the
higher order principal components are of decreasing importance,
experimental confirmation with respect to utility would be
required. The discussion has not been related to the time
dependence which would be essential to an ideal utility func-
tion. We have required the consistency axioms with consequent
non-recognition of "errors" of individual behavior, they not
being pertinent to a scalable attitude analysis. We would
stress that the interplay of mathematical and psychological
factors have led to developments which could not have resulted
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from independent application of existing techniques in either
discipline. We believe the concepts herein are worth inves-
tigating to determine if similar benefits can accrue in the
field of Utility Theory. We would further advocate a perusal
of all of reference (6) as more than adequate justification for
inclusion of the Social Scientist as an essential member of the




Comments on Probability Measures and Game Theory .
There is no idea or proposition in the field which can-
not be put in mathematical language, although the util-
ity for doing so can very well be doubted.
Lazerfield
I. Purpose .
The section of the bibliography devoted to decision theory
is but a small sample of the literature, and we would parti-
cularly recommend SCHLAIFER' s book for practical application.
But recognizing that the employment of mathematical techniques
has become so widespread, we would stress that some caution is
necessary. It is not the purpose of this appendix to detract
from the many valuable contributions that have resulted from
the application of probability, game and decision theory to
real life problems. We would simply demand the same degree of
preciseness in verifying assumptions in the application of
such theories as is required for acceptance of mathematical
theorems or algorithms. It is the purpose of this section to
illustrate the importance of this demand.
II. Probability .
A. Definition .
It is necessary to develop briefly some notation
relative to probability measures in order to discuss the
caution required in its application. We define a probability
measure as a quantification of the likelihood of occurrence
of an event and follow PARZEN' s (7) requirement of satisfying
the following axioms. (We would also acknowledge that some
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of the points to follow have been developed in a slightly
different fashion in PARZEN' s book.)
1. P(X) s^. (Probability of occurrence of event X
is non-negative.
)
2. P (X ) = 1 (Probability of occurrence of certain
event X is one )
o
3. P(X U Y) = P(X)-f- P(Y) (Probability of occur-
rence of two mutually
exclusive events is
sum of their probabil-
ities. )
P(X) and P(Y) represent the relative frequency of occurrence of
the events X and Y in a large number (N) of occurrences of the
random phenomena on which they are defined. For example, con-
sider a deck of N cards composed of a aces and b kings and let
X - draw of a KING and Y = draw of an ACE. Then,
1. P (X) = a > n P (Y) = b >. q
2. P (X ) = P(X) 4- P(Y) = a_i_b - 1
° N N
B. Application .
In the application of even these elementary probabil-
ity concepts, caution is required. We will use a list of
questions to illustrate some necessary considerations in the
application of probability measures.
1. Is the Process random?
If the concept of relative frequency is to be
useful, the phenomena must be at least approximately random.
If one were required to bet a large sum of money on the draw
of an ACE from our special deck, the utility of knowing
P(Y) would clearly depend upon a random shuffle. This is
recognized in legitimate gambling establishments and great
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care is taken to insure random shuffling, fair die balanced
roulette wheels, etc. Unfortunately, this has fostered a
faith which sometimes is carried over to uncontrolled processes
with a consequent equating of ignorance to randomness. Whereas
equal likelihood of any face of a fair die may be a logical
fact, equal likelihood of a submarine posit within an area may
represent a poor abstraction of a truly non-random phenomena,
2. Are long term frequency concepts valid for the
problem?
There is intuitive appeal in the frequency concept
for repetitive events. But in decision processes, we frequently
are going to act just once, and should question the usefulness
of the probability measures. If we consider the probability as
the measure of expectation of occurrence of an event (i.e., the
long term average) , we may be more interested in the variance
from that value than in the value itself, Consider the dif-
ferent information value in the probability that a submarine
will fire before reaching 4000 yards from the target versus the
knowledge that the probability that a submarine will fire beyond
6000 yards is diminishingly small. There are also psycholog-
ical aspects that are not revealed by the frequency concept
and these will be illustrated later in our discussion of game
theory.
3. How "good" are the probability measures ?
This question requires that we further define what
we have called P (X). For a discrete set of events, we can
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associate a number P with each event X. such that P(X.) = P.ii
rr\ i i i i
and
__
P. =1. But in many cases, for discrete and continuous
a-- i
x
spaces, there exists a function from which P(X) for any event
X can be obtained by integration:
rP(X) =
J
f (x)dx and P (All X) = I f(x)dx = 1
In most practical applications, the function f (x) is not
known, but assumed. Probably the most common example is the
assumption of normality (a density function that results in the
familiar bell-shaped distribution) . The normal law has so many
"nice" properties that statisticians are continually searching
for numerical techniques that will take a random phenomena that
does not obey the law and transform it into one that does. In
discrete processes, there is frequently an assumption of equal
likelihood or in the continuous case, an analagous assumption
of a uniform distribution because of the relatively simple
mathematical character of these distribution. Where replication
is possible, techniques exist to permit verification of these
assumptions, at least in terms of confidence limits. But if
such assumptions are to be made when there is no knowledge of
the underlying distribution, the consequences of a faulty
assumption must be part of the decision process.
4. Are the processes independent ?
The probability of two independent events X and Y
is defined: P(XY) = P(X)P(Y). In fact many authors define
independence as those events for which this rule is valid. To
illustrate the rule consider the probability of drawing an
ace from a normal randomized deck of cards (Event X) and also
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tossing a head with a fair coin (Event Y) , then, P (XY) =
4 • jL m I . In applying the assumption of independence
52 2 26
to uncontrolled processes, caution is required because
relatively few processes are truly independent. If one
assumed that the probability of failure of each component
of a missile were independent, a reliable design would be
unattainable. (With a mere 200 components, each of .99
reliability and an independent assumption, the probability
of a successful firing would be (.99) a practical zero
value.
)
5. Have the probability functions been used to
provide answers related to decisional requirements ?
a. Use of Bayes Theorem.
We will first have to define a conditional
probability. Consider two related events (B) and (C)
.
P(C/B) is defined at the probability of occurrence of C
given that B has occurred. Now let us assume that there




P(C./B) = P(B/C. )'P(C.
)
1 r/\
We will apply this theorem in a brief
example to indicate the necessity of relating probability
values to purpose in a decision problem:
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A contractor has a device that will detect an ICBM
firing 99% of the time. Such reliability would almost insure
purchase, but how should the information obtained from the
device be used? Let us assume a reliable intelligence estimate
that there is only one chance in a hundred that a missile will
be fired during a particular test period. On the first test,
the device indicates a detection. What is the probability
that a missile was fired (still assuming the intelligence
estimate is valid)? According to the Bayes theorem:
P (Firing/Indication) = (Prob Indication/Firing)- (Prob Firing)
Prob(Ind/Firing) • P (Firing) -L. p(lnd/No Fire) • P(no fire)
= ( 99) (.01) = 1
(.99) (.01) 4- (.01)(.99) 2
Note that although the device can indicate a fir-
ing 99% of the time, on the basis of the assumptions, only half
of all indications are valid detections. In this formulation,
the informational value of the given probability and the intel-
ligence estimate appear to be weighted equally. This may or
may not be an accurate assessment. But the Bayes formula does
illustrate the need for established criteria for the use of all
available information. Considering the time criticality of an
ICBM response decision, it is obvious that these must be pre-
determined.
b. LaPlace's Rule of Succession .
We earlier mentioned that sometimes lack of
knowledge of the underlying distribution of the random pheno-
mena led to an assumption of equal likelihood. Occasionally,
this approach may be useful, but the following example will
indicate that it can lead to absurd logic.
LaPlace's rule of succession requires an
assumption which may be illustrated by an idealized "unfair"
coin. It is assumed that the probability of a heads being
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tossed with this coin (or the occurrence of the event) is
equally likely to be any one of the numbers:
1 2_, N and N is large. (This statement re-
N N N
fleets that the uniform distribution approaches equal likeli-
hood on the interval to 1. ) Under this assumption , if the
first n tosses are heads, the conditional probability that m
subsequent tosses are heads is:
P(B/C) - n +- 1
n -+- m + 1
This is the general rule of succession. If m = 1, we obtain
the special rule of succession: P(B/C) = n -f- 1
n + 2
The latter equation has been applied to situations
of complete ignorance to assert that if a theory has been veri-
fied on n consecutive occasions, the probability of being veri-
fied on the next is: n
-f- 1. This is not an obviously irra-
n 4- 2
tional assumption. Consider a tourist in New York City who
for ten successive days entered a subway, boarded the first
train and subsequently arrived at Time's Square. On the elev-
enth day, an application of the special rule of succession would
indicate a probability of: 10
-f 1 = LI of arriving at Time's
10-1-2 12
Square by following the same procedure. But let's consider a
more subjective decision under uncertainty. Assume that in 15
recorded instances of U. S. troops landing in response to the
threat of communist aggression, there has been no evidence of
direct Russian participation. The. decision to land U. S,
troops in LAOS is now under debate. Can we suggest that the
probability of the Russians not directly participating would
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be 16/17? The confidence we should place in such an estimate
is revealed by quoting PARZEN' s example:
"A boy is ten years old today. The rule says that having
lived ten years, he has a probability of 11/12 of living one
more year, . . . .while his 80 year old grandfather has a proba-
bility of 81/82 of living one more year!"
6. Summary .
These comments have not been made to cast doubt on
the value or validity of using mathematical probability in real
world situations. Indeed, almost any realistic problem has so
much uncertainty that some probabalistic manipulations are in-
evitable The intent has been to stress the need for careful
examination of the hypothesis of the theory used to insure
applicability to the problem at hand. We have limited our
discussion primarily to a single variable (event). It is
clear that the problem of first isolating those variables that
are truly related to the decision requirements is of at least
equivalent significance.
III. Game and Decision Theory .
A. Introduction .
We will first consider the type of game that can be
displayed in a simple matrix form which is identified as a
two person, zero sum game. The abstraction assumes opposing
players whose strategies in the game can be represented by
the choice of rows and columns. The selection of a particular
strategy by each player determines an intersection in a unique
element of the matrix. The element indicates the value of
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the outcome to each player, the loss to one being identi-
cally equal to the gain of the other.
There are two primary questions pertinent to the
application of this game formulation. First, how are the
values of the outcomes determined? This again opens the
Pandora's box of Utility Theory. Although there are many
unsolved problems, usable results have been obtained by
assuming the existence of a linear utility function. For
example, WEART's article (see bibliography) illustrates
practical examples related to business decisions. As he re-
lates, many practical problems can be analyzed as a sequence
of simple two person zero sum games. The second problem
relates to the selection of strategies: what criteria is
used for their determination? It is this aspect of the
theory that we will emphasize in this section.
B. Decision Criteria .
Some of the more common decision criteria will be






Procedure: Observe the minimum of each row,
select row with maximum minimum:
max mi n a
.
(i) (j) 1J
Although this is a conservative procedure,
it does indicate a lower limit that is definitely obtain-
able. This value can be assured independent of knowledge
of the strategies of the opposing player. For, if random
strategies are allowed, the von Neuman proof indicates:
max min a (ij ) = min max a(ij) - V
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2. LA PLACE (Select single optimum strategy.
)




i \ iJ J
3. HURWICZ (Restricted Optimum)
Procedure: Choose row that maximizes a weighted
average :
Max((°< (Min) 4- (1- C< ) (Max) )
i
(Note: If o^ „ l, this is Wald Criteria)
There are of course other criteria, such as
Savage's reformulation of the matrix and prescribing a proce-
dure for minimizing "regret." We would recommend SALVESON'
s
article (see bibliography) for its excellent summary of work
in the Theory of Decisions. But to date there are no guide
lines for selection of a particular criteria in a general
sense. Further there are questionable aspects of all the
offered criteria. For example, selection according to
LaPlace's criteria is changed just by the addition of an
identical strategy and the WALD and HURWICZ procedures will
lead to different choices if a constant is added to each
column. The selection of a criteria is dependent upon the
philosophy of a decision maker - his tendency toward caution,
optimism, boldness, etc. Particularly when the criteria is
to be applied to a non-repetitive "game," the very abstrac-
tion into mathematical form may delete significant factors
pertinent to the selection of decision criteria. We will
illustrate this viewpoint in the next section.
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C. "TOWARDS INTER-DEPENDENT DECISIONS."
SCHELLING (3) has theorized that it may be useful to
view the zero sum game as a limiting case. At the opposite
end of the spectrum are games of complete cooperation, where
the "value" of the outcome is identical for each player. In
between are games of coordination, and it is claimed that in
real life, such games are the most prevalent. (As he illus-
trates, even in the fundamental East-West conflict, short of
total war, there is some degree of coordination required.)
But it is rare that explicit coordination can be achieved by
antagonists and hence an understanding of tacit bargaining is
essential. With no communication between players, or the
presence of non-perfect communications, there is still frequent-
ly a need for concerted action. SCHELLING states that this
mutual need will facilitate recognition of unique features
which will permit both players to select mutually beneficial
strategies. Further, the "signal" may be so obvious that one
player will limit his potential to "insure" concerted action.
We extracted several of his "game" type examples and
had a group of mathematically oriented students play the fol-
lowing games: (In all games, the upper value is the outcome















(Numbers represent the total num-





(8)According to LUCE & RAFFIA, any rational for
selection of (i,I) results in a similar rationalization for
(ii,II); hence both must lose. SCHELLING would claim that a
rational player can discipline himself to a lesser gain if a
clue indicates a mutual choice. For* example in this game
with no communication or other clues perhaps both would focus
on the first square. But note in the results listed that most
players selected a strategy with maximum personal potential


















(Note the changes in the results, although for practical pur-













Player I Player II
I II Mixed I II Mixed
3 7 3 4 3
(This game was intended to provide an "obvious" signal

























Player I Player II
I II III Mixed i ii iii Mixed102 7 712
(This game was intended to present a similar signal in a game
of potential risk, (iii, II))
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Conclusions ; The results of these games hardly support
SCHELLING's contentions. (We would note that the particular
students had recently completed a course in game theory with
primary emphasis on the zero sum game.) However, the prefer-
ence for mixed strategies does indicate an emphasis on oppos-
ing strategies to the detriment of recognizing the value of
cooperation through introspection. If a psychological analy-
sis can lead to a more freguent mutual gain than a strict
mathematical approach, then knowing how to recognize the
"signal" aspects of the problem is obviously important. As
SCHELLING points out, such easily accepted mathematical game
concepts as the independence of labeling and the irrelevance
of dominated strategies may not be valid in coordinated games,
We would emphasize that we have attempted to illustrate
but one aspect of SCHELLING' s rather novel approach to use of
game theory in real world decision problems. For the lay
reader, we would recommend his book as the most readable and
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